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A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SECURED FINANCING
Robert E. Scott *
Despite advances in finance theory, secured debt remains a puzzle.
As a consequence, the justification for the current legal regulation of
secured financing is similarly unclear. What purposes, whether benign
or malignant, does security serve? And what explains the peculiar sys-
tem of priorities established by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code? These are particularly urgent questions for students of commer-
cial law because legally created priorities among creditors are an appar-
ent aberration. In most legal regimes, equal treatment of those
similarly situated is an important normative goal. Indeed, much of fed-
eral bankruptcy law seems to reflect a conception of business failure as
a common disaster.' As with a flood or an earthquake, when unantici-
pated disaster strikes all victims are treated equally. Yet personal prop-
erty security is a discriminatory financing device, one that offers certain
creditors preferential treatment in any distribution of the debtor's
assets.
The conventional justification for such preferential treatment is
that security increases the aggregate amount of credit available to de-
serving debtors.2 Under this conception, creditors demand security for
certain debts as a way of reducing unacceptably high risks of default.
Without security, it is argued, such high risk debtors would be denied
* Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
I would like to thank Doug Baird, Michael Dooley, Ted Eisenberg, Tom Jackson,
Homer Kripke, John McCoid, Gary Peller, Glen Robinson, Roberta Romano, Alan
Schwartz, Paul Stephan, Bill Whitford, and the participants in workshops at the Univer-
sity of Virginia and Georgetown University for their helpful comments on earlier ver-
sions of this Article.
I am especially indebted to Saul Levmore, for his continuing interest in the progress
of this project, and for suggesting that no single explanation is likely to unravel the full
puzzle of secured debt.
1. A major goal of the Bankruptcy Code, for example, is to ensure equal treatment
of all creditors, see Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I at 19 (1973); 3J. Moore & L. King,
Collier on Bankruptcy, 60.01 at 743 (14th ed. 1977); A. Schwartz & R. Scott, Commer-
cial Transactions: Principles and Policies 775-77 (1982). For a further discussion of the
tension between the distributional and maximization norms of bankruptcy, see infra
notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., J. Van Home, Financial Management and Policy 536 (3rd ed 1974)
(Firms that pose a significant risk of default often "cannot obtain credit on an unsecured
basis .... In order to make a loan, lenders require security so as to reduce their risk of
loss.").
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access to credit markets altogether.3 Developments in modem finance
theory, however, have exposed an apparent fallacy underlying this con-
ventional wisdom. The benefits to secured creditors from taking security
are offset by the increased costs to unsecured creditors who face a corre-
sponding reduction in the pool of assets available to them upon de-
fault.4 Alan Schwartz has shown that, given certain assumptions,
secured credit is a zero sum game in which gains to some creditors are
achievable only by inflicting losses on others.5 Furthermore, since set-
ting up security arrangements is costly, the debtor's total credit bill-
consisting of both secured and unsecured credit charges-may be
greater under a regime of secured credit than in a world where security
is prohibited.
More recently, scholars have attempted to explain secured financ-
ing by examining variations in creditors' abilities to monitor their debt-
ors for misbehavior. These monitoring cost theories have taken several
forms. Thomas Jackson and Anthony Kronman, for example, suggest
that the more able monitors will extend credit unsecured in order to
capitalize on their comparative advantage, while less efficient monitors
will take security in order to reduce monitoring burdens.6 Saul
Levmore argues, to the contrary, that the better monitors will take the
security as compensation for the tendency of less efficient creditors to
"free ride" on their policing efforts.7 While the monitoring cost theo-
rists have provided important insights, their attempts to rationalize se-
cured financing have been limited, at least in part, by their inability to
explain completely the patterns of secured and unsecured credit that
are actually observed.8 Similar deficiencies blunt the force of alterna-
tive explanations that focus on security as a means of overcoming risk
aversion,9 or of screening for bad credit risks,' 0 or of reducing the inev-
3. SeeJ. Van Home, supra note 2, at 458-59.
4. See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 557-59; infra notes 16-19 and ac-
companying text.
5. Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current
Theories, 10J. Legal Stud. 1 10-11, 18-21 (1981) (monitoring costs and security are
inversely related) [hereinafter Schwartz, Current Theories].
6. Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale
LJ. 1143, 1158-61 (1979).
7. Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
Yale L.J. 49, 53-54 (1982).
8. See infra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
9. See generally, White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37
Vand. L. Rev. 473, 491-502 (1984) (absent security, risk-averse creditors would not lend
to risky debtors). But see Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 Vand.
L. Rev. 1051 (1984) (criticizing risk aversion explanations) [hereinafter Schwartz, Con-
tinuing Puzzle]. For a discussion of risk aversion, see infra note 19.
10. See generally, Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-
Signalling Approach, 8 BellJ. Econ. 23 (1977) (absent security, high-risk companies are
undervalued and managers have no incentive to extend credit); Thakor & Callaway,
Costly Information Production Equilibria in the Bank Credit Market with Applications to
Credit Rationing, 18 J. Fin. & Quantitative Anal. 229, 245-46 (1983) (imperfect and
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itable conflicts of interests between managers, shareholders and
outside creditors. I
The limitations of existing theories are even more apparent when
the inquiry shifts to a narrower focus on the code's singular priority
system. The Article 9 scheme is characterized by a single dominant fea-
ture: the institutionalization of the "floating lien."1 2 The Code en-
courages a single creditor to acquire exclusive control over a debtor's
financing opportunities by granting the creditor priority in all the
debtor's after acquired assets even as to uncommitted future ad-
vances. 13 But this exclusive control is eroded by special exceptions for
purchase money security interests and other junior creditors. Existing
theories do not rationalize these apparently contradictory aspects of the
Article 9 system principally because they start with an unduly narrow
conception of the function of collateral and of the debtor-creditor con-
flicts that it seeks to ameliorate.
This Article develops a theory of secured financing that posits a
debtor-creditor relationship much more complex and refractory than
that conceived by conventional analysis. This paradigmatic relation-
ship forms whenever privately issued debt is used to finance a firm's
growth opportunities or financial "prospects." Because peculiar
stresses may undermine the efforts of both debtor and creditor to ex-
ploit such prospects fully, the parties will predictably agree in the credit
contract to forego any actions that threaten the relationship. But the
manifestations of self-interested behavior are difficult to anticipate, and
their interaction with other variables is often complex and unpredict-
able. In such an environment, the parties frequently are unable to
achieve their mutually beneficial objectives through conventional con-
tractual arrangements. Thus, the impetus for secured financing derives
from the financing relationship itself and from the parties' desire to
exploit it fully.
Part I of the Article develops a conceptual analysis of the key deter-
minants of relational financing. A framework that focuses explicitly on
the nature of the debtor-creditor relationship leads to a deeper under-
standing of the diverse conflicts and stresses that can frustrate the ac-
costly information leads to credit rationing); Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle
(Oct. 2, 1985) (questioning whether secured lending reduces screening costs) (manu-
script on file at the offices of the Columbia Law Review). See also Schwartz, Current
Theories, supra note 5, at 14-21 (discussing signaling or "screening" explanations of
security); infra note 21 (same).
11. See generally, Myers & Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13J. Fin. Econ. 187 (1984);
Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39J. Fin. 575 (1984).
12. Through the combined effects of a number of provisions, Article 9 permits the
creditor to hold a lien that "floats" from one asset to another, and from one debt to
another. See Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838 (1959).
13. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-204, 9-205, 9-312(7) (1978).
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complishment of the parties' objectives. From this perspective, security
ameliorates the conflicts that would otherwise discourage firms from
financing investment opportunities with private debt. The leverage ob-
tained by holding the debtor's assets hostage empowers the secured
creditor to influence the debtor's business decisions, thus ensuring that
new projects are properly developed. Most significantly, this relation-
ship induces the creditor to provide valuable financial coordination and
control, with resulting benefits accruing to all participants in the
venture.
Part II tests the predictions of the relational theory against the
available evidence of how these credit markets actually function. Data
obtained from litigated priority disputes arising under Article 9, indus-
try reports and analyses over the same period, and contracting patterns
that have evolved in asset-based lending provide strong confirmation of
the congruence between relational theory and the observed characteris-
tics of certain business loans and business borrowers.
Finally, Part III uses this relational model of secured financing to
evaluate the peculiar legal regime embodied in Article 9 of the Code.
The relational model supplies a coherent justification for a variety of
previously controversial legal regulations. Thus, for example, those
provisions of Article 9 that appear to advantage the senior creditor with
a floating lien are explained by the benefits that the relational theory
predicts will accrue to all participants from the success of the financing
venture. On the other hand, there is a need to confine the potential
leverage security offers such creditors; this need is the key to under-
standing both Article 9 and Bankruptcy Code limitations on the float-
ing lien creditor.
I. A RELATIONAL MODEL OF SECURED FINANCING
A. The Security Puzzle Reconsidered: The Competing Hypotheses
1. The Zero-Sum Hypothesis. - The conventional vision of secured
credit assumes that security expands debtors' access to credit markets.
This conception rests on the premise that security offers financing op-
portunities to high-risk debtors who would not otherwise qualify for
credit.' 4 However, the insights of modern finance theory have seri-
ously undermined the conventional wisdom.
Finance theory offers two complementary visions of the capital
structure of the firm. The most provocative hypothesis traces its line-
age to the Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem. Modigliani and
Miller demonstrated that, under certain carefully specified assump-
tions, the value of a firm is independent of its capital structure. 15 In
essence, the Irrelevance Theorem holds that in perfectly functioning
14. See, e.g., J. Van Home, supra note 2, at 458.
15. See Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
(Vol. 86:901
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capital markets, absent taxes or bankruptcy costs, the particular mix of
debt or equity held by a firm has no effect on the firm's value. 16 Re-
cently, legal scholars have begun to apply the insights of the Irrele-
vance Theorem to the debate over the function of secured debt. 17 Alan
Schwartz has shown that with homogeneous, risk-neutral creditors pos-
sessed of perfect information, a system of security operates as a zero-
sum game.' 8 Under these conditions, the benefits to one creditor by
taking security are exactly offset by the increased cost imposed on an
unsecured creditor whose claim to the debtor's asset pool has been cor-
respondingly diminished. The "zero sum hypothesis" implies that the
existing system of secured credit may operate as a net loss to debtors.
Security interests are costly to create and administer. Moreover, if
creditors are generally informed about credit risks, the reduction in in-
terest charges that secured creditors are able to offer the debtor will be
offset by more or less equivalent increases in interest charges by un-
secured creditors. Thus, the debtor's total credit bill may well be larger
under a system which permits security interests than in a world in which
security is banned.
The zero-sum hypothesis searches for an explanation of secured
financing through the systematic relaxation of its carefully articulated
assumptions. Theorists have attempted explanations based on differ-
Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 270-75 (1958) [hereinafter Modigliani &
Miller, The Cost of Capital].
16. Id.; see also Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32J. Fin. 266 (1977); Modigliani & Miller,
Coprorate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 433
(1963) (tax benefit is only advantage of debt financing).
A formal proof of the Irrelevance Theorem can be found in Stiglitz, On the Irrele-
vance of Corporate Financial Policy, 64 Am. Econ. Rev. 851, 859 (1974). For a further
description and analysis, seeJackson & Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A
Reply to Professor Kripke, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 987 (1985); Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle,
supra note 9, at 1057-65.
The basic insight of the Irrelevance Theorem is that investors (under the conditions
specified by the Theorem) can purchase stocks of firms with differing mixes of debt and
equity securities, thus achieving an optimal portfolio of risk. Since investors can choose
for themselves the optimal leverage they desire, they would not "pay" firms to alter their
capital structure. It follows that a firm cannot increase its value to investors by altering
the debt-equity mix.
17. Professors Jackson and Kronman were the first to apply the Irrelevance Theo-
rem to the problems of secured financing. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at
1154-64; see also Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle, supra note 9, at 1055-60 (examining
theory that firms use debt financing to avoid creditor monitoring).
18. Schwartz, Current Theories, supra note 5, at 10. The zero-sum thesis was first
suggested in Scott, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32J. Fin.
1, 1 n.2 (1977) [hereinafter Scott, Bankruptcy] ("The [claim] that debt is often secured
because it reduces the risks of the lender ... [is] inadequate ... since it may be costly to
reduce the risks of lenders. Who bears these costs, and do the costs . . . exceed the
benefits of lenders?"). The key assumption underlying the zero-sum analysis is that un-
secured creditors will react to the reduction in the debtor's asset pool and concomitant
increase in risk caused by security and will raise their interest rates proportionately.
1986]
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ing risk preferences of creditors1 9 or imperfections in the credit mar-
kets themselves. 20 Thus, for example, in the real world of costly
information, security may function as a means of signaling other credi-
tors of the debtor's creditworthiness 2' or, in the alternative, as a means
19. See White, supra note 9. White's argument for differential risk aversion has
two components. First he argues that loan officers of lending institutions make individ-
ual judgments about risk. These judgments are based on the individual employee's
desires to maximize his own interests and not necessarily to maximize profits for the
firm. Since it is likely that risk preferences will be spread over some spectrum, security
overcomes the excessive caution of particularly risk averse employees. Furthermore,
White argues, there is some evidence that the lending institutions themselves may ex-
hibit differential risk distribution owing to variations in the legal rules that regulate their
lending activity. Thus, commercial banks, subject to more elaborate federal regulation,
are more risk averse than commercial finance companies that operate free from state
and federal banking laws. All parties profit, therefore, by permitting these risk averse
firms to take security.
The explanatory power of White's argument is limited by several difficulties. Any
explanation for security that depends on differential risk preferences among loan of-
ficers must explain why firms do not structure their reward and incentive systems so as
to reduce such conflicts of interest between firm and individual goals. The evidence is
that such incentive systems exist and ameliorate these agency costs much more effec-
tively than the alternative of allowing particularly risk averse employees to take security.
See, e.g., Roberts, Increasing Bank Profitability by Modifying Loan Officer Performance,
J. Com. Bank Lending, Feb. 1983, at 2. The argument that commercial banks are insti-
tutionally risk averse because of the effects of state and federal regulation is inconsistent
with the evidence that commercial banks have historically issued most of their credit
unsecured, while finance companies almost exclusively engage in asset-based financing.
See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
20. The possibility that participants in credit markets are both imperfectly and
asymmetrically informed about creditworthiness is the primary market imperfection that
has attracted scholarly interest. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
21. A rich scholarly literature attempts to explain the financing decisions of firms as
signals to other participants in the market. See, e.g., Bhattacharya, Imperfect Informa-
tion, Dividend Policy, and "the Bird in the Hand" Fallacy, 10 Bell J. Econ. 259 (1979);
Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8
BellJ. Econ. 23 (1977) (arguing that firms issue debt as a signal of managerial incentive
structures). The concept of signaling was first studied in the context of the product
markets by Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 QOJ. Econ. 488 (1970), and developed into an equilibrium theory by
Spence, Competitive and Optimal Responses to Signals: An Analysis of Efficiency and
Distribution, 7J. Econ. Theory 296 (1974).
The basic logic of signaling theory is simple. A particular debtor can, by issuing
secured debt, signal to others in the market that it is a better credit risk than competing
firms and thus obtain a lower interest rate. But the Irrelevance Theorem implies that
moral hazard would prevent secured debt from being a reliable signal of creditworthi-
ness. This is because Firm B (a high risk venture) could simply copy the signal of Firm A
(a low risk venture) at no cost to the firm. Stephan Ross has attempted to solve the
moral hazard problem by linking the signal to the incentive system of the firm's manag-
ers. Thus, the firm is signaling that it has structured its managers' incentives so as to
minimize the possibility that the managers can trade on inside information. See Ross,
supra, at 26-31. From this perspective, signaling theory becomes virtually indistinguish-
able from the costly contracting hypothesis discussed below. See infra notes 27-38 and
accompanying text.
In addition to the unreliability of the signal, there is substantial question whether, in
906 (Vol. 86:901
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of screening for eligible debtors.22 These explanations, however, are
incomplete. They do not show convincingly why security is a prefera-
ble means of overcoming such informational barriers as compared to
alternatives such as financial audits, the development of commercial
reputation, or long term financial relationships. 23
equilibrium, such signaling (if it exists) will, in fact, produce better matches between
creditors and debtors. If there is too much signaling in equilibrium (because the signal
is insufficiently informative) the social costs of using security for these purposes may
outweigh any informational advantages. See Schwartz, Current Theories, supra note 5,
at 14-21.
22. Screening explanations of secured debt are a variant of signaling theory. An
analysis of security as an efficient mechanism for creditors to screen good risks from bad
has been recently proposed by Buckley, supra note 10, at 27-30. Buckley argues that
creditors must invest in information to determine the prospective debtor's probability of
default and the anticipated value of the firm upon default. Such screening, however, is
costly. One strategy for reducing screening costs is to issue secured debt. Security will
reduce uncertainty that creditors have about the value of the assets upon default because
a secured creditor need only predict whether sufficient assets will be available to satisfy
his claim while the unsecured creditor must attempt to predict the priority of his claim to
these assets. Furthermore, secured lending will also reduce screening costs where the
secured creditor can exploit economies of scale in valuing secondary uses of firm assets
for various differing outcomes. Unsecured creditors, who may require this information
for only one purpose, need not invest at all where the asset has been removed from the
available pool and granted to the secured creditor. Thus $1000 spent by the secured
creditor in valuing the asset may generate more information than $100 spent by 10 cred-
itors.
Buckley's claim for the benefits of screening costs remains speculative for two rea-
sons. First, the uncertainty reduction caused by secured debt cannot be a central expla-
nation for the persistent use of security because it predicts that debtors would offer to
secure all their debt in order to reduce creditor uncertainty. But the evidence shows
that many firms only issue unsecured debt while others hold a mix of secured and un-
secured debt. See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 564; infra notes 139-45 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, screening explanations, as with risk aversion and sig-
naling hypotheses, fail to explain why creditors use security rather than other methods
to reduce information search costs. See supra note 21.
23. None of the various methods of promoting information exchange are un-
problematic. Thus, for example, financial intermediaries reduce some but not all the
risks of misrepresentation by debtors. See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 605-06 (1984). Similarly, the incentive to protect
commercial reputation and good will does not completely deter the debtor from misrep-
resenting his financial status. See Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assur-
ing Contractual Performance, 89J. Pol. Econ. 615, 618-25 (1981). Because extra-legal
sanctions will not always deter misbehavior sufficiently, parties will want to bind them-
selves to legally enforceable obligations. Thus, long-term financial contracts are often
an optimal solution to information-based problems. See generally, Goetz & Scott, Prin-
ciples of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1099-1111 (1981) (discussing spe-
cific covenants as means to enforce long-term contracts, and benefits and disadvantages
of each) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts]. The risks of strategic behav-
ior that attend the renegotiation of such specialized relationships can be alleviated by
the ex ante negotiation of a compensation package that extends over the expected life of
the relationship. Such a "relational" contract, however, introduces uncertainties and
complexities that frustrate the parties' efforts to specify accurate and specific perform-
ance standards in advance. Id. at 1102.
19861
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Underlining the inadequacy of signaling or screening explanations
is the possibility that information asymmetries explain the persistent
use of secured credit. Assume that poorly informed creditors do not
respond to the increased risk when others take security. In this case,
security may persist not because of its socially beneficial effects, but be-
cause it permits informed creditors to capture wealth at the expense of
other, uninformed creditors. Thus, firms may issue secured debt to
protect themselves against informed creditors who expect it and to ex-
ploit uninformed creditors who neither expect it nor react to it.24 But
such distributional explanations are inconsistent with the observed
characteristics of credit markets.2 5 Specifically, distributional explana-
tions predict that "firms will issue as much secured debt as possible; yet
firms often borrow without security. . . . [Furthermore,] many un-
secured creditors appear well informed." 26 As viewed through the lens
of the zero sum hypothesis, therefore, the puzzle of security remains
unresolved.
2. The Costly Contracting Hypothesis. - Both the Irrelevance Theo-
rem and its zero sum derivative assume that the credit contract is much
like any other complete contingent contract.27 But recent work in
agency theory leads to a competing assumption: a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship embraces a variety of risks that cannot be fully anticipated at
the time of contracting.2 8 This assumption implies that credit contracts
are more complex and unmanageable than the zero sum analysis ac-
24. Distributional explanations of secured debt were first suggested in Scott, Bank-
ruptcy, supra note 18, at 2-3; Scott, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital
Structure: Reply, 34 J. Fin. 253, 253-55 (1979) [hereinafter Scott, Reply]; see also
Schwartz, Current Theories, supra note 5, at 30-31 (giving example of wealth transfer
from uninformed customers to secured creditors); Buckley, supra note 10, at 15-26 (dis-
cussing defenses of secured lending in bankruptcy distribution). The premise of such
explanations is that some creditors (or credit markets) may not react to the issuance of
security by raising their interest rates. Debtors would then bargain for secured credit
because they would benefit from the lower interest rates charged by secured creditors
but would not incur higher interest rates elsewhere.
25. See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 565-67.
26. See id.; infra subsection II.A.3.
27. A complete contingent contract is a paradigm in which parties in a bargaining
situation are presumed able, at reasonable cost, to allocate explicitly the risks that future
contingencies may cause one or the other to regret having entered into the executory
agreement. In a complete contingent contract the only uncertainty associated with con-
tractual results concerns the probability of the contingencies themselves and not the
execution of the "instructions" imbedded in the agreement. Such a contract is the ideal
of contractual reliability. See Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analy-
sis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev.
261, 267 (1985).
28. See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 23, at 1092 ("relational
contracts create unique, interdependent relationships, wherein unknown contingencies
or the intricacy of the required responses may prevent the specification of precise per-
formance standards") (footnote omitted); Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics:
The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233, 237, 250-53 (1979).
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knowledges. The resulting "costly contracting hypothesis" 29 asserts
that contractual mechanisms that control inevitable debtor-creditor
conflicts can, in fact, increase the value of the firm.30
Several legal theorists working in this tradition have attempted to
explain secured credit as a means of controlling the risk of "asset sub-
stitutions."3 1 Thus, for example, after the credit contract is negotiated,
a debtor may gamble with the creditor's money by substituting riskier
business projects for the more conservative investments originally
planned.32 Presumably, some creditors are better able to monitor the
debtor for such misbehavior than are others. Jackson and Kronman
have used a monitoring advantage theory to suggest that poorer
monitors take security to focus their efforts at controlling asset substi-
tutions, while the better monitors are able to lend unsecured and ex-
ploit their comparative monitoring advantage. 33
TheJackson and Kronman theory is an important and original con-
tribution.3 4 However, the argument yields the counterintuitive conclu-
sion that those creditors who are typically unsecured, such as trade
29. The term comes from Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting, An Analysis
of Bond Covenants, 7J. Fin. Econ. 117, 121 (1979).
30. The costly contracting hypothesis (or agency-cost theory) addresses the prob-
lem of monitoring conflicts of interest between individuals who are engaged in a collec-
tive endeavor. The hypothesis is derived from Jensen and Meckling's seminal paper,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
Fin. Econ. 305 (1976). Jensen and Meckling's work was anticipated to some extent by
Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 Am.
Econ. Rev. 777, 779-81 (1972) and, as in all things, by Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 700 (E. Cannan ed. 1937). There have
been a number of applications of agency theory in the finance theory literature. See,
e.g., Miller, The Wealth Transfers of Bankruptcy: Some Illustrative Examples, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1977, at 39; Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5
J. Fin. Econ. 147 (1977).
31. See Smith & Warner, supra note 29, at 118-19. For a more detailed discussion
of asset substitutions see infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
32. As long as the new projects have the same present value as the old ones, asset
substitution has no effect on the firm's value. But the incentive for the firm's owners is
to gamble on projects with negative present values. All parties share equally in losses,
but the owners (after paying off the fixed debt) secure a larger portion of any upside
gains. See Levmore, supra note 7, at 52; Smith & Warner, supra note 29, at 119.
33. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at 1149-61.
34. TheJackson and Kronman argument has been further elaborated in D. Baird &
T. Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on Security Interests in Personal Property
361-67 (1984). Professors Baird and Jackson refine the comparative advantage theory
in several respects. First, they incorporate Professor Levmore's free rider argument:
better monitors take security interests in issets that are focal points for their specialized
monitoring services. Second, they argue that these "specialized" monitors co-exist with
"general" monitors. Some of these general monitors-such as local banks-remain un-
secured so as to exploit their comparative monitoring advantage, while other general
monitors-such as banks located in distant cities-take security in specific assets in order
to reduce their higher monitoring costs. The Baird-Jackson refinements are thus analo-
gous to the "mixed" monitoring system suggested by Professor Levmore. See Levmore,
supra note 7, at 58-59.
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creditors and employees, are better at monitoring against debtor mis-
behavior than are those typical secured parties such as banks and finan-
cial institutions.3 5 Moreover, the Jackson-Kronman model fails to
account for the signaling effects of security. If some creditors take se-
curity to reduce the risks of misbehavior, it is because they regard mon-
itoring the collateral as a good proxy for continued supervision of the
entire enterprise. To the extent that a debtor's efforts to increase busi-
ness risks-or otherwise to cheat on the agreement-require it to con-
vert assets, a secured creditor who merely guards against substitution
of its collateral has a monitoring advantage over the unsecured creditor
who presumably must continue to police the debtor's activities more
expansively. But if the continued viability of the collateral provides a
signal to the secured creditor, it presumably provides a signal to other
creditors as well. Saul Levmore has suggested, therefore, that un-
secured creditors would simply follow the secured creditor's signal and
thus free ride on the monitoring efforts of security holders.3 6 Since
under the Jackson-Kronman regime secured creditors are the less able
monitors, the free-rider problem implies that a system of secured credit
would generate unnecessarily high monitoring costs for the creditors as
a group.
As an alternative explanation, Levmore suggests that the dise-
quilibrium produced by the tendency of unsecured creditors to free
ride on the monitoring efforts of secured creditors would cause the bet-
ter monitors to take security as compensation for their efforts in reduc-
ing monitoring costs for the less capable creditors.3 7 This free-rider
analysis resolves some of the empirical problems encountered by Jack-
son and Kronman. Most importantly, it is compatible with the intuition
that banks and finance companies-parties that are typically secured-
are better at monitoring the debtor than are employees and trade
creditors.
On reflection, however, several problems remain unresolved. In
what way does granting secured creditors priority produce a more effi-
cient level of monitoring than would otherwise occur?38 And why is
35. A number of commentators have observed this empirical difficulty in the Jack-
son-Kronman analysis. See, e.g., A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 561-62;
Levmore, supra note 7, at 53; Schwartz, Current Theories, supra note 5, at II n.28.
36. See Levmore, supra note 7, at 53-55.
37. Id.; see also Smith & Warner, supra note 29, at 149 (discussing the free-rider
problem and its possible solutions).
38. These concerns with the operational dimensions of Levmore's argument are
analyzed in detail in Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle, supra note 9, at 1056-59. Schwartz
concludes that "[p]ut simply, the stable, pervasive existence of personal property secur-
ity is quite unlikely to be a response to the disequilibrium phenomenon of duplicate
monitoring." Id. at 57. While Schwartz correctly notes the tentative nature of the free-
riding explanation, his criticism is premised on the assumption that reduced monitoring
costs is a universal explanation of secured debt. Schwartz thus neglects Levmore's cen-
tral point that the freerider variable, though pervasive, is but one of the numerous forces
and components that shape business ventures. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 7, at
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taking security superior to substitute methods of controlling debtor-
creditor conflicts. The costly contracting hypothesis is a powerful ana-
lytic tool. But lacking a coherent theory for predicting when security is
the optimal contractual mechanism for controlling conflict, current ex-
planations only partially illuminate the patterns of secured and un-
secured credit.
3. The Limits of Current Theories. - Progress toward a solution to the
puzzle of secured debt has been slowed by unexamined assumptions.
For instance, current monitoring cost explanations are premised on the
benefits of collateral as a focal point for the creditor's efforts to discour-
age asset substitution or conversion.3 9 This focal point perspective
tends to emphasize the role of security interests in specific tangible as-
sets such as equipment, even though most secured financing of busi-
ness debtors involves continuing liens in generic assets such as
accounts receivable or shifting stocks of inventory. 40 By so restricting
the analysis, monitoring cost theorists have difficulty explaining the
typical short-term secured loan, where ordinary market mechanisms
such as reputation and good will would seem sufficient to deter asset
substitutions. 4 1 In addition, it is not at all clear how the free-riding
phenomenon works as applied to the focal point analysis. What assur-
ance do the unsecured creditors have that a secured creditor will not
simply repossess the collateral at a critical juncture and make itself
whole while they, having diminished their monitoring efforts, remain
oblivious to the onset of insolvency?42
These difficulties derive from the limitations of the key premise
76-83. Levmore leaves for others the question of how these diverse forces interact.
Thus, his analysis should be taken as provocative and suggestive, rather than completely
explanatory.
39. See, e.g.,Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at 1153-54 (arguing that a secured
creditor can focus his attention on the collateral and is free to disregard what the debtor
does with the remainder of his estate); Levmore, supra note 7, at 58-59, 68-70, 73 (us-
ing as an example the assignment of a railroad car as a focal point for monitoring among
numerous lenders and other investors).
40. See Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Com-
mercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929, 941-46 (1985).
41. The policing effects of the market appear to be an effective substitute for moni-
toring short-term secured loans-the "bread and butter" of Article 9 security interests.
A debtor who increases business risks after negotiating a short-term loan loses valuable
good will. If the debtor plans to enter the credit market frequently, this reputational
cost is likely to be quite high relative to the anticipated gains from asset substitutions.
See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 561. These reputational restraints are,
unfortunately, eroded whenever exogenous factors increase the risk of business failure.
See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
42. Buckley argues that the costs to other creditors of having to monitor the moni-
tor and the fact that a focal point security interest reduces the better monitors' incen-
tives to monitor, implies that security actually increases rather than reduces monitoring
costs. See Buckley, supra note 10, at 27-28. I argue below that his concern dissipates
once the monitoring function is expanded beyond the focal point conception. See infra
notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
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that the threat of asset substitution or conversion is the only debtor-
creditor conflict regulated by security. In fact, there are many other
sources of conflict between debtors and creditors. For example, the
debtor may continue to expand liabilities by issuing additional risky
debt. Alternatively, the debtor may pursue ill-advised ventures or,
more importantly, fail to exercise the effort needed to develop profita-
ble opportunities fully.43 Quite possibly the solution to the puzzle
of secured debt can be found in the parties' efforts to control these and
other conflicts between managers, shareholders, and outside
creditors. 44
An additional barrier to further insight is the implicit assumption
that security is a meaningful generic concept. But even a moment's
reflection reveals this assumption as particularly problematic. Before
the Code's adoption, many different patterns of asset-based financing
had evolved from specific market contexts.45 Suppliers of credit have
historically divided the total market by range of risk, purpose of loan,
and type of customer. This market segmentation may result from econ-
omies of scale in marketing, processing, and administering various
types of credit. But whatever the causes, the respective portfolios of
commercial banks, commercial finance companies, trade creditors,
mortgage lenders, venture capitalists, and bond investors are quite dif-
ferent. While the drafters of the Code sought to achieve some transac-
tional efficiency by bringing these diverse patterns under a single
regulatory scheme, they may have unwittingly contributed to the cur-
rent uncertainty. It is unlikely that a single explanation can rationalize
all of these various forms of security. Because they are attempts at
comrehensiveness, current analyses are vulnerable to criticism from
competing visions. As a consequence, the existing literature fails to as-
semble and evaluate even the most rudimentary data on patterns of se-
cured and unsecured lending.
B. The Determinants of Secured Financing
The discussion that follows develops in some detail a conceptual
43. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Myers & Majluf, supra note 11, at 214 (doubting that "the managers'
interests will be aligned with any outside investor's if the managers are given free rein to
trade on personal account"); Myers, supra note 11, at 581-85 (describing pecking order
theories in which firms finance in a sequence, starting with retained earnings, then se-
cured debt, then equity).
45. Pre-Code law recognized a wide variety of security devices which came into use
at various times making possible different types of secured financing. These diverse
transaction-types were regulated by separate statutes, such as those governing condi-
tional sales, trust receipts, factor's liens, chattel mortgages, crop mortgages, mortgages
on railroad equipment, and assignments of accounts receivable. Differences between
one device and another were manifested in formal requisites, and in the rights of the
secured party against the debtor, as well as against other creditors and third parties. See
U.C.C. § 9-101 comment (1978).
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analysis of a particular financing paradigm. The analysis will show that
certain debtors can best finance growth opportunities with private debt.
Unfortunately, such debt contracts inevitably reduce the debtor's in-
centives to develop the business opportunity as fully as it would if the
project were financed with equity. The leverage given to the creditor
under a blanket (or "floating lien") security agreement ameliorates this
conflict by motivating the debtor to maximize the joint interests of both
the creditor and the debtor, thus enabling the parties to capture addi-
tional gains from the project. Exclusive financing agreements coupled
with blanket security interests are superior to alternative mechanisms
principally because they alone enable the creditor to threaten effec-
tively to "turn off the spigot" if the debtor fails to cooperate. The ex-
ternal benefits of this financing arrangement derive from the valuable
financial planning and coordination provided by the creditor. The fi-
nancial inputs are a "public good" that will not be provided unless the
creditor can structure the relationship so as to capture a share of the
returns from the venture.
1. The Case of the Investment Prospect. - Casual observation confirms
the intuition that some debtor-creditor relationships are typically un-
secured, while in others security appears to be persistently used. What
might explain why security is issued for some debts and not others?
One obvious answer is that, all things considered, security is more at-
tractive than available alternatives in those relationships where it is typ-
ically employed.
In order to test this simple observation consider the following hy-
pothetical case in a world in which secured financing is prohibited. Im-
agine the Dunning Cabinet Company, a firm that manufactures wooden
television cabinets against orders on hand.4 6 Dunning is not a large
producer and currently is equipped for production runs of about 5000
units. It produces high-priced, quality cabinets which are sold to large
manufacturers of television sets for their console models. One hun-
dred percent of the equity interest in the company is owned by the
owner/manager Mr. Charles Dunning, who founded the company some
twenty years ago. InJanuary 1985, Dunning began to consider an addi-
tion to the company's single story plant which would double its produc-
tion capacity. The company's customers had been pressing for
production several times the operating capacity of the current
$1,000,000 annual sales volume. During 1984, orders totaling $1.7
million from six major television manufacturers were declined. These
represented initial orders only, and Dunning estimates that if these or-
ders had been accepted, repeat business would have easily tripled these
initial orders.
The Dunning Cabinet Company has operated profitably since its
46. The case of the Duning Cabinet Company is drawn loosely from P. Hunt, C.
Williams and G. Donaldson, Basic Business Finance: Text and Cases 743-48 (4th ed.
1971).
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founding, and it has never failed to have a substantial backlog of firm
orders from at least one television manufacturer. The company's trade
reputation is excellent, and with adequate production facilities the com-
pany could double its sales volume. Furthermore, the market area ap-
pears to contain an ample supply of skilled wood-working labor.
Dunning estimates, however, that the company would require an addi-
tional $500,000 in order to finance the proposed expansion. It also
believes further funds will be needed to increase the working capital to
a level that will support the expected increase in sales volume.
The current balance and income statements of the firm reveal the
following conditions. The company's sales have increased about five
percent each of the preceeding five years, and small profits have been
generated each year. The company's level assets and liabilities have
remained stable every year. The firm's net worth is $600,000 with a
total outstanding debt of $900,000.
In sum, Dunning Cabinet is a small, closely held company earning
modest profits every year; it has a fairly sound balance sheet having
only 1.5 times liabilities to net worth, and a twenty year business his-
tory. But now Dunning faces a new challenge: How can it finance this
growth opportunity in order to exploit the orders that are currently
being declined? There are three potential sources of additional financ-
ing. One possibility is to attempt to finance the new growth opportu-
nity out of retained earnings. Unfortunately, the company is
generating only small profits and those profits are being used to carry
higher inventories and accounts receivable to sustain the annual growth
of five percent. Alternatively, the company can either expand its debt
or raise equity capital. Since these two methods of financing involve
more complex questions, each will be analyized in turn.
2. The Alternative Sources of Financing. - Raising equity capital either
through private investors or the public markets appears to be an attrac-
tive financing alternative. For various reasons, however, most small to
medium sized companies such as Dunning will not pursue this means of
financing growth opportunities.
In the first instance, seeking private investors has a number of
practical disadvantages. In order to make the investment sufficiently
attractive to raise the desired capital, the owner/manager must fre-
quently relinquish substantial control over his enterprise. This is be-
cause the addition of equity owners who do not share control over the
venture generates significant conflicts that reduce the value of the pros-
pect to the potential investor.47 Once the equity interest has been sold,
the owner/manager has an incentive to "chisel" when computing the
profits that now must be divided among other shareholders. He may
47. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 349. The smaller a manager's share
of the firm, the greater is the conflict of interest between the interests of the manager
and those of outside equity claimants. In addition to chiseling, the manager may also
shirk on those obligations where returns are shared by the other owners of the firm.
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"pad" costs, disguising true returns and denying profits to the minority
shareholders, or divert his efforts to activities, such as leisure, where
the benefits are not shared. For instance, the manager may provide
himself with unnecessary amenities or an unwarranted salary. Of
course, gross abuses are relatively easy to detect. But often self dealing
and shirking can take a variety of forms that are difficult to discover.48
Because the "agency costs" that result from these conflicts will be
borne fully by the owner/manager as a reduction in the value of the
investment opportunity, the entrepreneur has an incentive to select a
less fractious method of financing.49
One possible alternative is to sell equity through public markets. A
well-developed public market controls many of the conflicts that plague
private equity investments. Managerial misbehavior is regulated by a
combination of market and legal mechanisms: the labor market for
managers, 50 the capital market and the traded value of shares,51 the
48. For an analysis of the analogous conflict that is generated by any profit-sharing
pricing mechanism in a franchise, patent license, or other distribution relationship, see
Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 23, at 1107-08. In addition to chiseling
and shirking, managers are concerned with protecting their human-capital investment in
the firm and thus tend to be shortsighted. This myopia will often conflict with the
broader, long-term interests of residual claimants. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, Rights
and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermina-
tion, 52J. Bus. 469, 481-84 (1979).
49. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 323-26. Jensen and Meckling were
the first to establish rigorously that contracting parties' incentives to economize on
transaction costs are reciprocal. Because the failure of the owner/manager to achieve an
optimal level of performance will be borne fully by the owner/manager as a reduction in
the value of his services, both parties have a parallel incentive to narrow the divergence
between ideal and actual performance by selecting an appropriate mix of monitoring
and bonding arrangements.
50. Manager misbehavior is controlled, in the first instance, by the managerial-la-
bor market. Competition among managers of different firms tends to ensure a competi-
tive compensation package. Furthermore, reputational costs will reduce the human
capital value of a manager whose performance generates costly conflicts with residual
interests. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. Pol. Econ. 288
(1980).
In addition to the "external" labor market for managers, there is also an internal
labor market that generates incentives for intra-firm control. Managers within a firm will
monitor other managers, not only vertically from the top of an organization down, but
horizontally as well. Thus, managers at the same level and even below have incentives
to monitor others in the market, both because of the interdependence of their activities
and because of the prospect of "leap frog" advancement. See Alchian & Demsetz, Pro-
duction, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 782
(1972); Fama &Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26J.L. & Econ. 327, 332
(1983); Jensen & Smith, Stockholder, Manager and Creditor Interests: Applications of
Agency Theory (University of Rochester, Graduate School of Management, Working
Paper Series No. MERC 84-03).
51. When determining the price to be paid for the firm's shares, potential investors
are motivated to anticipate conflicts between managers and outside shareholders. These
forces induce the firm to establish mechanisms that will reduce costly deviations from
optimal behavior. SeeJensen & Smith, supra note 50, at 15-16.
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market for takeovers and acquisitions,52 as well as an elaborate internal
regulatory apparatus. 53 For many firms, therefore, public equity mar-
kets provide an attractive and cost-effective method for financing the
kinds of opportunities that Dunning faces. Unfortunately, small busi-
nesses such as Dunning cannot readily sell new equity in the capital
markets. Access to public markets requires a substantial initial invest-
ment in a variety of professional services. The costs of investment
bankers, securities lawyers, and accountants raise substantial barriers to
entry into financial markets for firms with modest financing needs. 4
These firms are motivated instead to raise additional capital by issuing
more debt.
Long-term public debt is subject to the same entry barriers that
deter access to public equity markets. 55 Moreover, if the firm used
long-term debt to finance a short-term growth prospect, it would incur
a larger interest bill than necessary to finance the venture. 56 On the
other hand, short-term private debt can be structured to coincide with
the business needs of the debtor. There is easy access to a competitive
market without costly investment in ancillary financial services, and the
entrepreneur retains residual ownership and control over the firm.
Though the precise costs and benefits cannot be predicted, for impor-
tant classes of transactions private debt is thus the most efficacious fi-
nancing strategy.
3. Relational Financing: The Benefits of Exclusive Control. - Assume
that Dunning approaches several banks seeking to borrow some or all
52. The market for "corporate control" permits alternative management teams to
search out and acquire mismanaged firms. The free transferability of common stock
permits outside competing managers to bypass current management and take over the
rights to manage the firm's resources. These rights can be acquired through merger
negotiations, tender offers, proxy solicitation, or direct solicitation of stockholders. See
Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, I1J. Fin.
Econ. 5, 6 (1983); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol.
Econ. 110, 112-14 (1965).
53. The public corporation has a number of internal control devices that reduce
conflicts between managers and shareholders. For example, a board of directors that
ratifies and monitors the firm's decisions and hires and compensates managers repre-
sents a means of separating management from control so as to reduce opportunities for
misbehavior. Hierarchical organizational structures in which initiatives rest with junior
management and ratification and implementation with senior officers have a similar
function. These structures also serve to diffuse specific knowledge relevant to decision-
making among many managers, further strengthening the internal control apparatus.
See Fama &Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26J.L. & Econ. 301, 309-11
(1983); Jensen & Smith, supra note 50, at 10-13.
54. One source estimates that the price of "going public" increased from $50,000
to $75,000 in the 1960s to $200,000 to $250,000 by 1981. Furthermore, these costs
were for registration, legal and accounting fees, printing, etc. and did not include the
underwriter's share. See Kaye, Commercial Financing: A Tight Money Strategy for
Smaller Companies, Mgmt. Rev., Feb. 1981, at 17, 17.
55. Id.
56. A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 509-10
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of the $500,000 investment. In order to clarify the decisionmaking pro-
cess, assume initially that the parties can costlessly enforce any credit
terms on which they may agree. Assume further that the proposed ex-
pansion by Dunning is a firm-specific opportunity; that is, if the oppor-
tunity is not developed, the firm cannot "sell" any rights in the
prospect to third parties. But the firm can, in effect, sell the develop-
ment rights to prospective lenders. Indeed, since the firm can only re-
pay the debt out of the proceeds of the new venture, it is appropriate to
conceive of the debt contract as the sale of a financing opportunity.
Initially, Dunning must decide whether to conduct an auction, sell-
ing "pieces" of the prospect to the highest bidders, or to sell the entire
claim to a single creditor. Much like a technological innovation, opti-
mal development of a business venture requires coordination in order
to fashion an ideal sequence of inputs. If the development rights are
divided among competing firms, the prospect may be poorly devel-
oped.5 7 Any single creditor will be reluctant to invest in long-term de-
velopment where the benefits of such long-range planning may be
captured by its competitors. Many business ventures, moreover, re-
quire precise timing and coordination of investment decisions-such as
when to build up inventory or when to invest in capital expansion-in
order to realize fully the anticipated gains. Competition between credi-
tors for priority rights may result in premature or suboptimal develop-
ment of the prospect.58
57. The social benefits of exclusive control over technological opportunities were
first shown by Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 348,
351-52 (1968). See also Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20J.L. &
Econ. 265, 275-80 (1977) (introducing the idea into the legal system and applying it to
the patent system).
58. This key proposition can be illustrated by an example derived from Barzel,
supra note 57. Assume that an initial fixed investment of $500 (in monitoring, loan
administration, etc.) is necessary to pursue a firm-specific growth opportunity. Thereaf-
ter, the creditor earns a net premium of 5% over the 10% competitive rate of return on
all subsequent advances to the debtor. Suppose that the opportunity would require ad-
vances of $600 if pursued in year 1, and that subsequent growth would cause advances
to increase by $200 in each successive year. Table 1 then shows the three alternative
earning streams for the creditor.
Table 1
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
1. Investing Immediately 90 120 150 180 210 240 990
2. Competitive Investment Elsewhere 110 130 150 170 190 210 960
3. Optimal Investment 110 130 150 180 210 240 1020
Obviously, a creditor will be better off by selecting the third option: postpone the in-
vestment outlay until year 4, thus earning the maximum return. But unless the creditor
can restrict entry by competitors, his desire for additional profit will lead him to invest in
year i and thus capture the opportunity. Unfortunately, the premature action motivated
by competition generates a social loss of $30.
The logic that underlies this example is simple: if the output of the growth oppor-
tunity expands over time, the prospect will become progressively more profitable, since
the fixed cost of pursuing the project initially is independent of the output while the
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The optimal development of any growth opportunity thus requires
that a single creditor retain the exclusive control over the financing of
the investment. Since repayment of the debt will be made from the
proceeds of the contemplated expansion, if a single bank controls the
development of the entire project it can retain a first option on a share
of all of the proceeds received by the debtor.
Assume, for example, that the unique benefits of exclusive control
motivate Dunning to sell the exclusive rights to the financial opportu-
nity to First Bank in exchange for a line of credit up to $500,000 and
associated expertise and financial guidance. Under the terms of such
an agreement, the bank will receive an interest premium above the
competitive rate of return on all loans committed to the project. Thus,
the greater the volume of business activity generated by the debtor, the
more the economic rents earned by the bank.59 Such an arrangement is
not a joint venture in the technical sense because the parties do not
share the profits. Nonetheless, it is a venture in which the parties share
joint interests in the same sense as any licensing or franchise agreement
in which one party is paid a commission or royalty based upon the vol-
ume of business activity undertaken by another. Presumably, Dunning
will agree to pay such a premium precisely because the arrangement
encourages the exclusive financer to supply the financial management
and other inputs necessary for optimal development of the prospect. 60
The bank's efforts to enhance its own return will enhance the success of
the venture.
Once the exclusive financing contract has been negotiated, the par-
ties will confront the need to cooperate in fully developing the pros-
pect. In order to achieve the profit-maximizing return, the parties must
commit an optimal amount of both financial and operational inputs to
the venture. This means that each party must now act as if it owned all
of the property rights in the prospect. Only by a mutual exchange of
"best efforts" can the optimal level of both financial and operational
interest payments are proportional to the output. See Barzel, supra note 57, at 348-49;
Schmookler, The Level of Inventive Activity, 36 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 183, 190 (1954).
59. The bank earns a premium-a super-competitive return-on the venture, be-
cause the exclusive financing agreement increases the opportunity cost to the debtor of
the next best available financing substitute. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
Econ. 297, 299 (1978). To be sure, the initial bidding by the various potential lenders
will produce a competitive "price" for the exclusive financing rights. But this price will
take into account the prospective economic rents from relational financing.
60. The bank's premium over the competitive rate is tied to the output of the
growth opportunity, since as the output of the opportunity expands so do the advances
necessary to support it. Thus, the bank has an incentive to provide ancillary services
that will increase output. The parties' interests are not perfectly linked, however. Be-
cause the bank's return is tied to output and not profits it will predictably supply less
than the full effort necessary to maximize thejoint interests from the venture. The bank
bears the full cost of financial management, but any benefits in excess of the agreed-
upon return are retained by the debtor.
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inputs be produced. This is because each party's returns are depen-
dent on the other party's efforts. Fortunately, at the time the debt con-
tract is negotiated, the parties share a mutual interest in fully
developing the prospect. By maximizing the joint returns from the
venture, the individual shares are similarly enhanced. In such coopera-
tive ventures, therefore, the efficient debt contract would provide that
each party "pay" the other to undertake the optimal level of the respec-
tive activity. In a world in which such contracts could be costlessly en-
forced, this exchange of efforts offers the parties the opportunity to
exploit fully the returns from their mutual venture.
61
4. Conflicts of Interest: A Typology of Debtor Misbehavior. - Assume
now that the exclusive financing contract between Dunning and First
Bank is subject to the normal contracting costs of negotiation and en-
forcement. How does the introduction of costly conflicts affect the pre-
ceding analysis? Although mutual cooperation offers both parties the
opportunity to obtain the maximum benefits from the contemplated ex-
pansion, actually securing those gains in costly environments poses
vexing contractual dilemmas. Once the agreement has been negoti-
ated, critical conflicts of interest threaten to dissapate the anticipated
gains from the new opportunity. Monitoring cost theories focus typi-
cally on only two types of actions misbehaving debtors take that under-
mine the relationship. 62 But, in fact, at least four distinct debtor-
creditor conflicts can be identified.
A widely-recognized conflict is the danger that, once the agree-
ment is concluded, the debtor will increase the riskiness of the prospec-
tive business venture. 63 Such "asset substitutions" 64 occur because
debt financing permits the debtor to gamble with the bank's funds. If
the venture is successful, all the returns in excess of the fixed debt ac-
crue to the debtor. If the venture fails, the debtor and the creditor
share the loss. Thus, the debtor is motivated to select high-risk, high-
return projects.
Debtors may also misbehave in a more odious fashion by con-
verting business assets to private use. As with any agent who has con-
trol over another's property rights, the debtor may be motivated to
61. See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 23, at 1109-11.
62. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 7, at 52-53; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6,
at 1149-50; Smith & Warner, supra note 29, at 118.
64. The economists' designation of this type of debtor misbehavior as "asset substi-
tution" can be misleading. The term, properly used, refers to any changes in a firm's
investment policy or business projects that increase the variability of the firm's assets.
See Smith & Warner, supra note 29, at 117-18. Frequently, the debtor's strategy will be
to "put all his eggs in a single basket" by undertaking investments that increase the
covariance of the firm's assets. See generally Black & Scholes, The Pricing of Options
and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 637 (1973) (establishing the relevance of vari-
ability to firm value).
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steal. Most commonly, this involves syphoning assets from the cooper-
ative venture to activities that are wholly owned by the debtor.
A third conflict is the threat that the debtor may dilute the credi-
tor's claim. For instance, Dunning might be tempted to issue addi-
tional risky debt that will compete with the claim of the initial lending
bank in any distribution of assets upon default. Particularly where this
additional debt is used to pursue high-risk, high-return business oppor-
tunities, the debtor is able to increase the value of the residual equity
claim while diluting the claim of various holders of the firm's debt.6 5
The first three debtor-creditor conflicts are present in all debt con-
tracts. But the vexing problem of underinvestment (or inadequate ef-
fort) is peculiar to exclusive financing contracts. Once the debtor sells
a portion of the payoffs of the new project, the entrepreneur loses some
of his incentive to pursue the project vigorously. Instead, efforts will be
diverted to activities such as leisure or alternative investments where all
the returns are retained by the debtor. The underinvestment conflict
means that firms that finance growth prospects with risky debt will fail
to exploit fully their investment opportunities even though further ef-
fort could make a positive net contribution to the firm's market value.66
This point can be illustrated by a simple example. Let Vp represent
the marginal returns from the growth prospect to the firm, I the margi-
nal investment necessary to continue to develop the opportunity, and P
the marginal interest payment to the creditor. If Dunning opts for eq-
uity financing, then it is obvious that the owner/manager will continue
to pursue the growth opportunity until I = Vp, thus ensuring that the
prospect is fully developed. However, assume that the investment is
financed through the contemplated debt contract with the First Bank.
From the perspective of the owner/manager, the opportunity is now
worth developing only until I + P = Vp. In other words, the returns
from the growth prospect must now be greater than (or equal to) the
sum of the required investment outlay and the promised interest pay-
ment to the creditors. 67 This is the point where the debtor's own prof-
its are maximized. The requirement that Dunning pay interest to the
bank on the additional investment thus separates their interests. The
bank would urge additional investment since it earns an interest pre-
mium on the additional debt. Unfortunately, the debtor's self-interest
65. See Smith & Warner, supra note 29, at 118.
66. The underinvestment problem was first analyzed by Stuart Myers. Myers sug-
gested that growth opportunities were analogous to call options. The value of these
options depends on whether the firm uses them optimally. But if the firm has outstand-
ing risky debt, situations can arise in which stockholders do not benefit even from highly
profitable investment decisions, because the benefits go primarily to the debtholders. In
these instances, the "options" may not be exercised at all, and the firm's value is accord-
ingly reduced. Myers argues that firms can control this conflict by matching effective
maturities of assets and liabilities. See Myers, supra note 30, at 163-70.
67. If! + P > Vp and the investment in the growth opportunity is still pursued, the
owner/manager's outlay will exceed the market value of his shares.
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will motivate him not to invest further in the project even though I <
Vp and the additional gains remain unexploited.68
The underinvestment phenomenon is merely an illustration of the
general principle that an agent will systematically fail to exercise the
effort necessary to maximize the joint product where a part of the re-
turns must be repaid to the principal in the form of a fixed royalty or
commission.69 Such arrangements skew the congruence of interest be-
tween debtor and creditor concerning the appropriate level of effort to
be expended in developing the venture. Once the debtor's return is
reduced by a fixed repayment to the creditor, there is an inherent con-
flict of interest between the parties over the profit-maximizing invest-
ment strategy. The owner/manager's self interest will induce him to
invest less in the growth opportunity (and instead pursue alternative
projects that are wholly owned) than the creditor's interest would
demand.
How can these conflicts be reduced without the use of security?
Both the bank and Dunning have an incentive to structure their debt
contract so that possible stresses are controlled. This requires cost-
effective monitoring or bonding mechanisms. 70 Monitoring methods
include direct supervision through audits and inspections as well as in-
centive systems designed to reduce conflicts of interest. These ar-
rangements are costly to both parties, however, and such costs are
reflected in the terms of the original loan. Thus, the interest rate may
be improved by substituting reassurances of performance by the debtor
in the form of bonding provisions. Among the variety of possible
bonding arrangements are negative loan covenants, self-imposed ethi-
cal standards of behavior, performance bonds and unilateral termina-
tion clauses.71 While the precise mix of monitoring and bonding
68. The divergence of interests results from the fact that the debtor regards the
interest payment (P) as a cost and thus he will pursue the prospect only until his margi-
nal costs (I + P) are equal to his marginal revenues (Vp). If the debtor were to invest
beyond this point, his own profits would be reduced. From the perspective of the joint
interests of both parties, however, the interest payment is not a cost but merely a distri-
bution of the returns, thus the mutual interests would be enhanced if the debtor contin-
ued to invest until the joint product is maximized at I = Vp even though I + P > Vp. In
an ideal world, the debtor would agree to the greater undertaking, even though at the
time of the investment it represents a loss to the debtor, because the bank would be
willing to agree in advance to a compensatory contractual concession through which the
two parties can split the additional profits generated by the greater investment. See
Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 23, at 1112-26.
69. See id. at 1112-19.
70. The parties are motivated ex ante to minimize net expected agency costs.
Thus, they will expend resources in monitoring or bonding only so far as these efforts
are cost-effective in controlling misbehavior.
71. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. See infra notes 89-93 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, the parties are also concerned with mechanisms designed to mini-
mize misbehavior by the creditor. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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measures cannot be predicted, we can examine the efficacy of the vari-
ous options open to the parties.
5. Loan Covenants: The Limits of Contingent Contracting. - One re-
sponse to conflicts between creditor and debtor is to negotiate a com-
plete contingent contract, 72 in which the debtor's obligations are
clearly specified and appropriate sanctions agreed upon. Clearly stated
rules of behavior facilitate both the detection and penalizing of actions
that violate the agreement. 73 Indeed, contingent contracts are widely
used in many contexts. For instance, publicly traded debt instruments
all incorporate standard form indentures and an elaborate laundry list
of negative covenants that prohibit suspect activities.74 Similarly, loan
covenants in term loans typically forbid the debtor from either incur-
ring additional debt or issuing dividends without permission, and place
restrictions on future investment policy, mergers, and similar activity. 75
Unfortunately, two problems limit the efficacy of negative covenants.
First, these obligations are not self enforcing. The creditor must use
the state's cumbersome and error-prone enforcement mechanism in or-
der to impose a sanction for breach. 76 Second, even the most elaborate
72. See supra note 27.
73. See Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Con-
tractual Obligations, 69 Va. L. Rev. 967, 977-78 (1983) (unambiguous, categorical state-
ment of performance responsibilities reduces the risk of evasion of contractual
obligations) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle].
74. See American Bar Foundation, Commentaries on Model Debenture Indenture
Provisions, apps. B & C (1971) [hereinafter Commentaries]; Committee on Develop-
ments in Business Financing, A.B.A. Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business
Law, Model Simplified Indenture, 38 Bus. Law. 741 (1983); Smith & Warner, supra note
29. The standard form indenture covenants are incorporated by reference into the
terms of publicly traded debt securities. See U.C.C. § 8-202(1) (1978). The most com-
monly used covenant, found in even the highest rated bonds, is the negative pledge
clause. This clause forbids the debtor firm from issuing subsequent secured debt that
will rank ahead of unsecured debentures. A companion covenant restricts sale-leaseback
transactions. See McDaniel, Are Negative Pledge Clauses in Public Debt Issues Obso-
lete?, 38 Bus. Law. 867, 867 (1983). There are a number of other covenants whose
frequency of use are inversely related to the rating of debentures. Typical negative cov-
enants include restrictions on investment in other firms, bulk sale of assets, mergers, the
payment of cash dividends, and the issuance of additional debt. Less frequently seen are
affirmative covenants that either require the debtor to maintain working capital above a
mimimum level or to maintain the firm's tangible assets. See Commentaries, supra, at
450-56; Smith & Warner, supra note 29, at 125-40.
75. Short-term loans from commercial banks or other institutional lenders invaria-
bly have a negative pledge clause in addition to restrictive covenants. See Arnold, How
to Negotiate a Term Loan, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 131, 133; Castle, Term
Lending: A Guide to Negotiating Term Loan Covenants and Other Financial Restric-
tions, J. Com. Bank Lending, 26, 32 (Nov. 1980); Commentaries, supra note 74, at
349-67 (debentures); McCann, Term Loan Handbook (1983); Zimmerman, An Ap-
proach to Writing Loan Agreement Covenants,J. Com. Bank Lending 2, 14 (Dec. 1975).
76. The typical debt contract will include a clause that accelerates the entire obliga-
tion once a covenant has been breached. In order to recover the amount owed, how-
ever, the creditor must first obtain a judgment and then have the state execute against
the debtor's assets. Priority in the debtor's assets will typically date only from the time a
922 [Vol. 86:901
RELATIONAL THEORY
restrictive covenants only respond to three potential conflicts: asset
substitution, conversions and claim dilution. Negative covenants are
not effective in controlling the conflicts over growth opportunities.
The underinvestment problem does not involve a prohibited action but
rather the failure to take an action. The failure to undertake or fully to
pursue a valuable investment prospect is an opportunity cost and thus
not well policed by specific prohibitions. Indeed, the indicia of inade-
quate effort are complex and uncertain and cannot be fully anticipated
in advance.77
A complete contingent contract is thus not a feasible contracting
mechanism for controlling the underinvestment conflict. One response
to this dilemma is to define the respective obligations in general terms.
For instance, the parties might agree that Dunning is to use his best
efforts to fully develop the growth prospect, and that the bank will have
the right to terminate the venture and call the loan whenever it deems
itself "insecure." 78 Unfortunately, because these obligations are stated
in general terms, the parties now confront even more difficult problems
with detection and enforcement.
6. Short-Term Financing: The Limits of Sequential Contracting. - The
problem of enforcing general standards of behavior is exacerbated be-
cause the exclusive financing arrangement removes the parties from the
constraints of the competitive market.79 One alternative is to finance
the prospect through a short-term revolving loan. This appears at first
glance to be an optimal solution. Debtors such as Dunning will have to
reenter the financial market periodically to support their investment.
The need to maintain a market reputation and goodwill thus acts as an
effective check on various types of misbehavior.80
But several problems mar the utility of sequential contracting solu-
judgment or execution lien is acquired (usually, for example, by sheriff's levy). Enforce-
ment of the lien requires a sheriff's sale, or other state-regulated liquidation procedure.
To be sure, legitimate fears of either asset substitutions or conversions are grounds for
an ex parte attachment procedure, but speed and the element of surprise are imperiled
by the demands of procedural due process. See generally, Scott, Constitutional Regula-
tion of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 Va. L.
Rev. 807 (1975).
77. See Smith & Warner, supra note 29, at 129-31.
78. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle, supra note 73, at 984-86
(discussing best-efforts provisions among options available to establish a general stan-
dard of obligation).
79. An exclusive dealings contract exposes a party (for example, a debtor or a cred-
itor) to the risk that its contracting partner will fail to extend the best efforts that were
promised. Furthermore, the absence of a competitive market forecloses an important
means of monitoring debtor misbehavior. See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts,
supra note 23, at 1103-05.
80. Market reputation may well be a more effective restraint on misbehavior than
any restrictive covenants. If a debtor creates too much secured debt, pays out too much
in dividends, or fails aggressively to pursue projects with a positive present value its
bond rating will be lowered, and its borrowing costs will rise. Many publicly traded
firms, for instance, seek a debt level that will result in a bond rating of A or better. See
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tions. There is, in the first instance, an unfortunate synergy between
the risk of business failure and the risk of the various types of misbehav-
ior. As the probabilities of business failure increase, so do the debtor's
incentives to engage in high risk or wrongful conduct designed to sal-
vage the sinking enterprise. As long as the debtor's business prospects
remain good, a strong reputational incentive deters misbehavior. But
once the business environment deteriorates, the owner/manager is in-
creasingly influenced by a "high roller" strategy. The poorer the pros-
pects for a profitable conclusion to the venture, the less the
entrepreneur has to risk and the more he stands to gain from impru-
dent or wrongful conduct. For instance, the debtor may now be moti-
vated to convert assests in order to milk the dying operation of cash
reserves. Alternatively, under the pressure of failure, the debtor may
engage in highly perilous strategies for renaissance. Most commonly
perhaps, the debtor may substitute and juggle assets, hoping that with
time and an improved business environment the enterprise will re-
cover. In the language of game theory, the enhanced risk of business
failure changes the environment from an iterated or an ongoing exer-
cise in mutual cooperation to a single shot or end game strategy. Once
business failure looms, market and reputational constraints recede as
important factors restraining debtor misbehavior.
In addition to the limits of the market as a restraining influence,
the use of sequential contracting imposes costs that may offset its bene-
fits. Sequential, short-term contracting does permit the parties to spec-
ify more precisely the types of disfavored behavior that the debtor
should eschew. But the process of renegotiation poses new problems.
One of these is the possiblility that over the life of the financing rela-
tionship the parties will make contract-specific investments in the ven-
ture. As specialization occurs, each party becomes more vulnerable to
strategic demands by the other. When the debt arrangement is renego-
tiated, the bargaining stakes are greater and both parties have incen-
tives to use strategic or opportunistic behavior in order to secure a
larger slice of the enhanced contractual "pie." Continuance of the
original relationship becomes increasingly desirable in order to exploit
the accrued specialization advantages, but the division of these gains
must be bargained out in a non-competitive environment.81
Not only does the use of sequential contracting impose worrisome
renegotiation dilemmas, but it also impairs the very benefits that led
the debtor to sell exclusive control of the financing opportunity. To
develop the investment optimally, the creditor must be assured of con-
trol over the venture during the life of the transaction. The threat of
competing financers encourages the creditor to develop the prospect
too quickly, thus securing short term gains at the expense of greater
McDaniel, supra note 74, at 871-72; Piper & Weinhold, How Much Debt is Right for
Your Company?, Harv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug. 1982, at 106, 111.
81. Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 23, at 1100-01.
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long-term returns to the enterprise as a whole.8 2
C. The Function of Security
1. Beyond Conventional Wisdom. - Assume now that the parties are
able to contract for a secured loan arrangement. How does the intro-
duction of security affect the financing relationship? The conventional
view of security is that it functions as a priority claim to designated as-
sets, thus protecting the creditor's investment should the debtor de-
fault.83 Under this narrow conception, security serves no clearly
identifiable role in resolving the relational dilemma. Even with a prior-
ity claim to specific assets, no rational creditor would finance a pros-
pect, the proceeds of which are the source of repayment, where the
creditor knows that some or all of the growth opportunity will not be
realized. Indeed, the conventional focus on security as a method of
protecting against default tends to obscure the possibility that security
instead serves to enhance the many more frequent instances in which
the business venture succeeds.
Monitoring cost theorists have expanded the traditional concep-
tion of security by linking it to the creditor's attempt to control debtor-
creditor conflict through monitoring.84 But the focus on asset substitu-
tion and conversion has similarly deflected the analysis. If all the credi-
tor is doing is watching focal points (such as a key piece of equipment
or specific items of inventory) in order to facilitate supervision of the
debtor, then security offers only marginal advantages over traditional
loan covenants. After all, even without security the creditor can still
scrutinize the debtor for evidence of misbehavior.85 Furthermore, the
focal point conception of security does not address the underinvest-
ment problem at all. Focusing monitoring efforts on particular items of
collateral may well aid in reducing the risk of asset substitutions, but it
offers no assistance in encouraging greater efforts from the debtor who
fails to pursue fully the planned expansion. A creditor who carefully
82. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at 1143, 1147-48 (should debtor
become insolvent, security permits a creditor to appropriate as much of its collateral as
is necessary to satisfy its claim); Schwartz, Current Theories, supra note 5, at 7 (same).
84. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
85. A careful reader might object that this argument misses the free-rider insight.
If there were insufficient monitoring without security, creditors would be encouraged to
monitor if granted a security interest in the debtor's assets. In turn, the other creditors
would want to know that the secured parties' monitoring efforts does them some good.
Thus, the argument goes, the security interest in a focal point would satisfy both of these
objectives. See Levmore, supra note 7, at 53-55. But the key assumption is that without
security the level of monitoring would be inadequate. Such an assumption is implausi-
ble so long as monitoring activity is tied to focal points. See Schwartz, Continuing Puz-
zle, supra note 9, at 1057-58. If monitoring behavior is freed from the focal point
perspective and examined as a pervasive activity, the free rider insight can be rehabili-
tated. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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monitors a specific piece of equipment will still not know whether the
equipment is being used productively.
What is required, therefore, is a broader conception of the means
by which security acts to control debtor-creditor conflict. Assume, for
example, that First Bank does not take a security interest in a lathe or in
Dunning's inventory of finished cabinets in the warehouse. Assume in-
stead that the parties agree that First Bank is to have a security interest
in all of the debtor's accounts receivable and inventory presently held
and after acquired. The interest will secure a current commitment of
$250,000 as well as all future advances even where the subsequent ad-
vances are made without commitment. Any student of Article 9 will
understand that this is no extraordinary transaction. Indeed, rather
than the security interest in specific focal points, the "floating lien" in a
general pool of assets securing both present and future advances is the
financing paradigm underlying Article 9.
By granting the exclusive financing creditor a blanket security in-
terest, the debtor is better able to sell claims to the payoffs of the new
project. Thus, not only does the creditor purchase an investment in the
venture (in the form of an interest premium), but also a specific claim to
the resulting accounts. Beyond the familiar notion of security as an as-
set cushion upon default, this relational security arrangement serves
two related functions that enhance the prospects for a successful ven-
ture. First, combining exclusive financing with a blanket security inter-
est provides the creditor with critically important leverage or strategic
influence over the debtor's operational decisions. Second, relational
security serves as a credible commitment, evidencing the debtor's re-
solve to develop the prospect fully. Each of these functions needs to be
separately analyzed.
2. Leverage: The Value of Strategic Influence. - Relational security
serves the obvious function of controlling the various types of active
misbehavior by debtors. Thus, for example, a security interest in all the
debtor's accounts and inventory supports the creditor's efforts to deter
conversions, improvident risky business ventures, and the dilution of
the claim through wrongful issuance of subsequent debt. These risks
are well-understood, however, and often can be curtailed equally well
by substitute measures such as restrictive loan covenants. Much less
obvious is the phenomenon of leverage.8 6 By taking an interest that
wraps around the debtor's business, the bank gains important influence
over the debtor's strategic planning and operational decision making.
The creditor's power comes from the ability to veto any proposed ac-
tions by withdrawing either financing or assets from the enterprise. A
floating lien that supports an exlusive option to make future advances
gives the creditor the power both to seize the debtor's assets (for exam-
86. I use the term "leverage" in this Article in its traditional sense: the power
gained by using a lever to apply force at one point in order to exert greater force at a
second point.
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pie, through self-help repossession, and direct collection) 7 and to ter-
minate the financing necessary for the operation of the business. This
power to "turn off the spigot" permits quick and decisive responses to
the threat of disfavored behavior.88 As with any lever, the power to
prevent a disfavored action generates the power to compel a second,
desired action.
Leverage is important to the creditor in two respects. First, it miti-
gates the problem of end game behavior by debtors facing default. The
synergy between the risk of business failure and the risk of misbehavior
diminishes the reputational restraints that short-term financing exerts.
To the extent that business failure is a product of managerial incompe-
tence, leverage permits the creditor to ensure that strategic planning is
not ill-advised or ill-conceived. Economies of scale give the relational
creditor a particular advantage in financial planning and the coordina-
tion of investment decisions.8 9 In addition, leverage encourages the
debtor to develop projected investment opportunities fully and thus
has a unique role in solving the underinvestment dilemma. Relational
security arrangements enable the creditor to influence the nature and
timing of the debtor's production inputs. Insufficient or misdirected
efforts are extraordinarily difficult to detect and to sanction. While the
creditor must continue to monitor the debtor's activities to discover
such errors of omission, the leverage of blanket security encourages
prompt compliance when such errors are uncovered. Thus, even under
severe time constraints the relational creditor can ensure that produc-
tion is increased, or inventory built up, or even that the order and tim-
ing of raw material inputs is reconsidered. In each case, the creditor's
influence comes from the extraordinary potency of the combination of
exclusive financing and blanket security.
3. Credible Commitments: Security as a Hostage. - In order to exercise
leverage the relational financer must monitor the debtor's operational
decisions. Direct supervision of these activities involves substantial ad-
ministrative costs in hiring investigative personnel, training auditors,
etc. When monitoring costs, such as direct supervision, are high rela-
87. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-502 & 9-503; infra notes 202-11 and accompanying text.
88. The power of the lever derives from the combination of exclusive financing and
blanket security. The exclusive financing creditor whose blanket security interest ex-
tends to both present and future advances can effectively cut the debtor off from alterna-
tive financing, unless a second lender is prepared to refinance the entire venture. See
infra note 192. Furthermore, secured creditors have the right to declare default and
proceed directly against the collateral without judicial process. See infra notes 202-11
and accompanying text.
To be sure, the right to foreclose on the collateral is available to all secured credi-
tors. But exclusive floating liens offer a unique combination of control over financing and
over the debtor's assets. Thus, the creditor can effectively shut down the business-at
least temporarily.
89. See infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
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tive to actions by the debtor that reassure the creditor, both parties will
agree ex ante to substitute cost-effective bonding alternatives.
The relational security device serves the additional function of a
bond given to ensure faithful efforts toward accomplishing the ven-
ture.90 By offering his assets as a hostage,91 the debtor invites the cred-
itor to exercise actual operational control should he default on the
agreement. For all practical purposes, the entrepreneur places his
business in escrow, with the creditor serving as the escrow agent. The
effectiveness of the bond derives from the severity of the sanction
should any misbehavior be detected. This form of reassurance is par-
ticularly appropriate where the risk of misbehavior is difficult to detect
as in the case of inadequate efforts or underinvestment. The debtor
agrees to the arrangement because the threat of legal liability similarly
constrains the creditor from misbehaving. Although the creditor re-
tains the power to exercise control should the debtor misbehave, there
are significant costs in actually assuming control that will deter any friv-
olous or bad faith action. A controlling creditor incurs enchanced risk
of liability under both securities law and the common law of torts. Fur-
thermore, should the debtor subsequently be reorganized in bank-
ruptcy, the creditor's control will cause it to be designated an "insider"
and subjected to more rigorous (and often disadvantageous) scrutiny.92
The additional role of relational security as a valuable precommit-
ment strategy for certain debtors enhances its effectiveness. By grant-
ing security, owner/managers such as Dunning may grant security in
order to reduce their opportunities to misbehave when events generate
unanticipated stresses. Relational security limits the debtor's options
when responding to the subsequent threat of business failure. While
standard economic theory maintains that debtors would prefer to retain
all their choices including the choice subsequently to misbehave, a
precommitment analysis suggests that such security may simply be
90. A blanket security interest can serve a signalling as well as a bonding function.
By being willing to put up the bond, the debtor signals creditors that it is not the type of
debtor who misbehaves or defaults on debt contracts. But it is important to see that the
bonding function is independent of the signalling function. A debtor may issue security as
a signal to creditors about characteristics that are not directly observable. On the other
hand, even where the debtor's characteristics and reputation are well-known, putting up
security serves an important precommitment function in controlling ex post misbehav-
ior. Thus, the signalling function of security focuses on ex ante contract negotiation,
while visualizing security as a bond focuses on ex post contract enforcement. See Gross-
man & Hart, Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives, in The Econom-
ics of Information and Uncertainty 107, 109-10 (J. McCall ed. 1982).
91. The hostage imagery was introduced into bargaining analyses by Schelling, An
Essay on Bargaining, 46 Am. Econ. Rev. 281, 300 n.17 (1956). See also Williamson,
Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519,
522-26 (1983) (formally developing a hostage model in the context of private ordering
in intermediate product markets).
92. For a further discussion of the risk of controller liability, see infra notes 101-13
and accompanying text.
928 [Vol. 86:901
RELATIONAL THEORY
some debtors' method of protecting their present decisions against fu-
ture temptations. 93 Furthermore, the debtor's willingness to constrain
his future decision making in this way signals the creditor of his resolve
not to violate the terms of the debt contract. Because the debtor bears
the cost of misbehavior ex ante, he has an incentive to agree to mecha-
nisms that will limit his own ex post opportunities to cheat or otherwise
misbehave.
4. The Costs of Security: Controlling Creditor Misbehavior. - By linking
exclusive financing to a floating lien the parties are able to control sub-
stantially the underinvestment conflict. But if relational security has
such unique benefits, why isn't every debt secured? One obvious an-
swer is that relational security generates offsetting costs that, at least in
some contexts, motivate parties to select substitute methods of financ-
ing. In addition to the direct costs of creating and administering secur-
ity interests, relational security generates a reciprocal risk of creditor
misbehavior. Redfaced cheating by the creditor is not a serious prob-
lem. Market and reputational constraints and the ease of detection will
likely deter most instances of outright bad faith. But the conflicts pro-
duced by the inevitable divergence between the parties' interests are
more difficult to resolve. Two specific problems can be anticipated.
The creditor's myopia in pursuing new growth prospects incites an
initial conflict. The creditor is only concerned with developing those
prospects in which it has a financial interest. For instance, a major tech-
nological change might encourage the debtor to invest in new or previ-
ously uncontemplated projects. But the creditor, with a fixed return,
has a perverse incentive to forbid the debtor from taking additional
risks, even though the opportunities have positive value to the firm.
Renegotiating the terms of the debt contract is the only plausible solu-
tion. Unfortunately, renegotiation must be carried out in an atmos-
phere of heightened opportunism on both sides. Both parties will have
made transaction-specific investments in their relationship. The result-
ing bilateral monopoly means that substantial resources will be con-
sumed in costly strategic maneuvering. 94 One resolution of this
potential conflict is to agree in advance that the debtor has the right to
seek alternative financing for the asset substitutions needed to alter the
current investment policy. To reassure the creditor, the agreement
may authorize termination of the financing relationship if alternative
financing is procured.95 Such an agreement permits the debtor to ob-
93. For a discussion of the role of precommitment strategies and other choice man-
agement behavior in various contractual settings see Scott, Error and Rationality in Indi-
vidual Decision Making: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and
the Management of Choices, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 329, 342-47 (1986).
94. See Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle, supra note 73, at 982-83 ("Rene-
gotiation.., creates a moral hazard in addition to the obligee's indifference: the obligee
[in this case the creditor] may actually threaten to exacerbate [the problem] unless the
obligor [debtor] purchases his cooperation at a premium.").
95. The costs and benefits of using unilateral termination privileges as bonding
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tain new assets for new ventures by offering another creditor a security
interest superior to the initial loan. 96 Thus, the parties are at least re-
turned to their initial market position if renegotiations break down.
A second problem concerns the quality of the hostage offered by
the debtor. If the assets that are offered as hostage have a ready resale
market, then the creditor faced with end game problems will have an
incentive to induce breach, declare default, and sell the hostage.9 7 Ide-
ally, therefore, the hostage should constrain the debtor, but not tempt
the creditor. This concept is best explained by the metaphor of the
"puny prince." s98 Assume a medieval king offers his sickly son as hos-
tage to a neighboring monarch as security for a promise to repay a
debt. Both parties profit if the king's commitment to repay is credible,
but the neighbor is not enticed to declare default by the desirability of
the hostage. The value of the commitment lies in the king's love and
affection for his son despite the prince's lack of physical strength. Yet
the concomitant risk that the creditor monarch will provoke a default
and make off with the hostage is similarly reduced since the puny prince
has little value to anyone else. The puny prince theme suggests that in
cases where the debtor is offering assets (such as inventory and receiv-
ables) that have a readily realized market value, both parties would
profit from restraints on the creditor's ability to foreclose on the collat-
eral when the relationship is threatened by business reversals.
5. The External Benefits of Relational Financing. - The relational
model offers a basis for evaluating the function of security in certain
debtor-creditor relationships. But the question raised by the zero sum
hypothesis needs to be squarely addressed. Does security have positive
external effects that offset the increased risk it imposes on unsecured
mechanisms, and the effects of legal regultion of such options are developed in Goetz &
Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 23, at 1130-49.
96. The function of purchase money security interests as devices to curb the risk of
misbehavior by creditors is further developed infra notes 219-30 and accompanying
text.
97. The risk of induced breach is a function of what I have previously termed the
"breacher-status" problem. See Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle, supra note 73,
at 983.
A [debtor] who contests the [creditor's] interpretation of [the debtor's] obliga-
tion[s] by withholding any part of the disputed performance risks being charac-
terized as a breacher. Obviously, the status of breacher is disadvantageous
because the breacher [(or defaulting) debtor may be] liable for compensatory
damages. Frequently overlooked, however, is [that a defaulting debtor also
loses his] accrued interest in what may be very valuable return rights.
Id. There is only one breacher, and he frequently loses the entire benefit of his bargain.
The breacher status problem gives parties an additional incentive to select clear, defini-
tive rules of obligation to safeguard the initial rights allocation. Clear rules of obligation
however, are not feasible in the relational financing context. Thus, the creative use of
security is often the second-best solution to this contractual dilemma.
98. The imagery is Oliver Williamson's. Williamson uses an "ugly princess" for-
mulation, which I have recast in a more innocuous stereotype. See Williamson, supra
note 91, at 526-27.
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creditors? Two external benefits are generated by a relational security
arrangement. Singly or in combination they suggest that, at least in the
relationships described above, security is a cost-effective mechanism for
debtors seeking to exploit new financing opportunities.
a. The Prospect Function: Financial Management as a "Public Good. "-
The prime external benefit of relational security is the opportunity it
provides for debtors to finance positive value prospects. The relational
model shows that without security some valuable growth opportunities
will not be pursued, and, more importantly, those that are will be un-
derdeveloped. At least for debtors who cannot raise equity as a feasible
financing alternative, security provides a singular contracting mecha-
nism for increasing the value of the firm. The external benefits of this
arrangement are the valuable financial management and related inputs
offered by the relational creditor. These inputs are a "public good" to
the extent that more sophisticated financial counseling enhances the
general business prospects for the debtor. Moreover, these valuable
services will not be provided unless the bank can structure the relation-
ship so as to capture the returns from its efforts. Exclusive financing
arrangements coupled with blanket security are better than alternative
mechanisms principally because this system enables the creditor to en-
sure that its financial advice will be heeded by the debtor.
Viewed ex ante, therefore, the expected gains from the relational
creditor's participation in developing growth opportunities will accrue
to all participants in the venture, including equity claimants and un-
secured creditors. To be sure, existing creditors will not necessarily
share in the increased value of the firm's assets, and thus some may
regard the pursuit of the growth opportunity as an unnecessary risk.
Nonetheless, the prospect's expected value represents a net gain to the
firm as a whole. In theory, the debtor firm can share these benefits
expectationally with all claimants thus reducing its total credit bill. In
other words, any additional risks resulting from the new business ven-
ture are more than offset by the additional assets available to cover the
obligation to repay unsecured creditors. From the debtor's perspec-
tive, therefore, relational security is a positive-sum transaction.
b. The Policing Function: Coordinated Monitoring as a "Public Good. "-
A secondary benefit of relational security follows from the economies
of scale that attend the monitoring of the debtor's business activities.
Careful monitoring of the debtor's operational decisions, as well as its
assets, is essential to the prospect's success. The use of relational se-
curity thus provides a signal to other creditors that a broad-based mon-
itoring of the debtor's affairs is under way. In essence, relational
security signals other creditors that a policeman is walking the beat,
and thus they can relax their vigilance in taking individual precautions.
Recast in slightly different form, the secured creditor reemerges as
the monitor "paid" by those creditors who subsequently rely on his
efforts. Released from the focal point hypothesis, the free-rider insight
1986]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
can now better withstand critical scrutiny. Because monitoring cost
theorists have been challenged to explain how the free-riding mecha-
nism might work, a more complete elaboration of this point is required.
Suppose that, without relational financing, three separate creditors
are required to monitor the debtor effectively and to minimize the vari-
ous types of misbehavior. Each creditor focuses primarily on protect-
ing its individual investment. Thus, for example, C I, a trade creditor,
merely watches the length of payables in order to prevent conversions
and skimming. Since trade credit is revolving and self-liquidating, the
trade creditor has no particular incentive to guard against other types
of misbehavior. C 2, however, is an unsecured creditor, such as an em-
ployee or the holder of a service claim, and is principally concerned
about claim dilution. C 2 monitors only the nature and amount of sub-
sequent debt incurred by the debtor. Finally, C 3 is a supplier under an
installment contract and is concerned with asset substitutions that in-
crease the risk of his fixed price credit arrangement.
It is tempting to suggest that since the activities of C 1, C 2, and C 3
are not duplicative, their monitoring efforts are optimal. But now as-
sume C4 enters into a relational financing contract with the debtor such
as the one described above. In order to control the unique stresses of
the relational contract, C4 cannot rely on the others and must engage
in a pervasive monitoring strategy. Such monitoring allows C 1, C2,
and C3 to quit monitoring. Since C4's interest is virtually coextensive
with the debtor's general business welfare, relational monitoring avoids
the problem of other creditors having to watch the monitor for fear that
he may protect only his interests. C4 cannot effectively protect his in-
terest without safeguarding the others. In addition to assuming the
others' monitoring responsibilities, the shift to C4 is likely to reduce
total monitoring costs. C4's comparative advantage derives from two
sources. First, C4 as a relational financer can exploit economies of
scale in the fixed cost of monitoring the assets and decisions of debtors.
Second, by exercising control over all monitoring activities, C4 can co-
ordinate efforts more efficiently than if the tasks are divided between
C I, C2, and C3.
6. Summary. - Small, closely held firms frequently face growth op-
portunities. The relatively high cost of alternative methods of financing
often leaves private debt as the most feasible method for realizing these
financial prospects. The desire to develop the prospect fully motivates
debtors to sell to a single creditor an exclusive claim to a share of the
returns from these new projects. But these exclusive financing arrange-
ments create singular conflicts that pose vexing contractual dilemmas.
A blanket security interest in the assets committed to the venture
reduces these enforcement costs and thus ensures that the firm's invest-
ments are developed properly.
Relational security agreements precommit the debtor to develop
each business project optimally. The leverage gained by holding the
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debtor's assets hostage enables the creditor to influence business deci-
sionmaking, particularly when the relationship is threatened by an im-
pending default. Without security, some projects of positive present
value will not be pursued, and others will be inadequately developed.
In that sense, when the expected costs of substitute mechanisms exceed
the expected gains from the project, it is indeed fair to say that such
firms "cannot borrow without security." 99 In addition, the global mon-
itoring required of the relational creditor releases other creditors from
the focused monitoring tasks that they would undertake in the absence
of a relational creditor. The resulting cost savings thus provides addi-
tional economies that are unlikely to be achieved where such security
arrangements are not permitted.
Relational theory suggests, therefore, that given the variations in
firms and business conditions one would expect to see differing pat-
terns of credit transactions-some secured and some not.100 By linking
the persistent use of security to a particular debtor-creditor relation-
ship, many of the theoretical difficulties that characterize other explana-
tions can be resolved. But the ultimate value of relational theory
depends on two further questions. Does the model yield predictions
that can be tested against the available data on the actual operation of
credit markets? And does the theory illuminate the peculiar regulatory
scheme found in Article 9? These questions are considered in the fol-
lowing parts of this Article.
II. AN EMPIRICAL INqUIRY: RELATIONAL THEORY AND THE OPERATION
OF CREDIT MARKETS
A. Generating Testable Hypotheses: The Properties of Relational Financing
The principal test for relational theory lies in its ability to predict
patterns of financing that are actually observed in credit markets. Re-
grettably, there is little available data that compare secured and un-
secured credit. Initially, therefore, a more limited question must be
asked. Is the relational financing model at least consistent with what we
do know about the nature and operation of credit markets? In evaluat-
ing this preliminary question, one must remember that relational the-
ory does not purport to explain all patterns of secured debt. Rather,
the goal of this section is the more modest one of developing testable
hypotheses explaining the use of security in several prevalent financing
relationships.
99. See Stiglitz & Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,
71 Am. Econ. Rev. 393,402-06 (1981). But see Buckley, supra note 10, at 38 (criticizing
Stiglitz and Weiss' contention that high levels of debt will lead to credit rationing).
100. Both the zero sum and the monitoring cost theorists have made a single
flawed assumption: that security serves the same function in all credit arrangements.
This has led to an attempt to identify the welfare effects of security arrangements di-
vorced from the very contexts that give the question meaning.
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1. Why Creditors Do Not Assume Operational Control. - It is tempting
to suggest that the best proof of relational theory is evidence that se-
cured creditors who finance growth opportunitites assume direct, oper-
ational control over the debtor's business affairs. Thus, the fact that
such operational control is rarely observed may lead one to doubt the
validity of the relational model. The absence of direct control can be
traced, however, to the potential legal liabilities such a creditor may
incur. By participating directly in the management of the debtor, a
creditor risks incurring liability both to the debtor and to third parties
under federal bankruptcy law, federal securities law and related regula-
tory statutes, and under common law tort theories. In each case, the
key issue is whether the creditor has assumed "control" of the debtor.
The Bankruptcy Code has expanded measurably the relational
creditor's risk by explicitly incorporating the concept of the "in-
sider."'' 1 In general, an insider is one whose relationship with the
debtor is so intimate that his conduct is subject to closer scrutiny.' 0 2 In
addition to officers and directors of the debtor, any person in "control"
of the debtor is an insider. 10 3 There are a number of reasons why a
creditor would not wish to be designated an insider. Payments to insid-
ers may be subject to a one year preference period, rather than the
conventional 90 day period.10 4 This means that an accounts receivable
lender who is deemed an insider may be required to disgorge any im-
provement in its collateral position that occurs during the entire year
preceding bankruptcy. 105 Furthermore, an insider can expect the bank-
kruptcy court to scrutinize its claim for evidence of fraud or overreach-
ing more closely than those of creditors generally. Abusive control will
invite equitable subordination of the secured parties' claims to the
claims of general creditors. 106
Potentially adverse consequences may also arise under the Bank-
ruptcy Code merely by virtue of a creditor's direct or indirect "interfer-
ence" in its debtor's business affairs.' 0 7 Primary or secondary liability
101. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(28) (1986).
102. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1977).
103. The Bankruptcy Code does not define control. See generally, Koch, Bank-
ruptcy Planning For the Secured Lender, 99 Banking LJ. 788, 798-807 (1982) (discuss-
ing conditions imposed by a lender that might be deemed control). Nonbankruptcy case
law, which may be drawn on for guidance, emphasizes the fact-specific nature of the
inquiry. See, e.g, Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 125-26
(1962).
104. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1982).
105. Id. § 547(c)(5).
106. See, e.g., In re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470, 478 (D. Minn. 1980); see
generally Macey, No Fault Subordination of Loans in Bankruptcy, 85 Com. L.J. 44
(1980) (discussing recent cases defining investor's controlling involvement in
companies).
107. See, e.g., Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939) (equitable adjust-
ment in bankruptcy of a creditor responsible for mismanagement of debtor's affairs). In
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may arise in analogous circumstances under the federal securities
laws.108 A creditor in a controlling position may be found primarily
liable for violations of the registration, prospectus, and disclosure re-
quirements of the Securities Acts. 10 9 In addition, a creditor may incur
secondary liability under the Acts as a "controlling person" held re-
sponsible for the debtor's fraud or misrepresentation. 1 0 Similarly, a
controlling creditor may incur tort liability for wrongful interference
with contractual relations."' Thus, whenever a creditor exercises op-
erational control over the business affairs of a financially troubled
debtor, it risks subordination of its claims against the debtor as well as
the imposition of statutory and common law liability.
This is not to say that the risk of liability will deter relational secur-
ity agreements. Rather, the risk of controller liability is simply one of
the costs of an otherwise beneficial relationship. But the threat of such
liability does suggest that creditors will attempt to structure their rela-
tionship with the debtor so as to avoid the indicia of direct operational
control. Among other strategies, this would suggest two possible
courses of action. First, the creditor may substitute the use of strategic
leverage in advance of financial difficulty so as to preclude the need to
assume a more direct role in management affairs. Second, the creditor
may employ contractual substitutes-such as restrictive covenants for-
bidding disfavored debtor actions-in lieu of the more direct mecha-
nisms of control over management decisionmaking. To be sure, the
leverage provided by the combination of security and restrictive loan
covenants may itself be proscribed as "latent" control. 1 2 But there is a
general, whenever the creditor controls the debtor either by holding voting control of its
stock, or by commanding dominant influence in management, the creditor may be found
to have a fiduciary duty to the debtor requiring good faith and fair dealing in all transac-
tions. See Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Interference
with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. Law. 343, 347-52
(1975).
108. The Securities Act of 1933, § 15 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77o
(1982)); The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t (1982)).
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t (1982). See, Lipton, Commercial Banks' and other
Lenders' Responsibilties, in Expanding Responsibilities under the Securities Laws (S.
Goldberg, ed. 1973); Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 107, at 353-55.
110. Secondary liability of a controlling person most typically involves liability
under Section 10 and Rule lob-5 of the 1934 Act for fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. See Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 107, at 358-60.
111. See, e.g., Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 85 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.
1936) (bondholder's suit against controlling creditor bank for wrongful interference
with contractual relations by inducing subsequent secured debt in violation of negative
pledge clause).
112. See, e.g., Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 125-26
(1962) (control need not actually be exercised under Interstate Commerce Act); M.A.
Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581, 589 (1941) (control under Securities Act includes "an ability
or power to exercise from time to time a controlling influence in the management and
policies of a company.").
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lower risk of incurring liability with such an arrangement than there
would be if the creditor were to obtain a personal guarantee, be active
as a director of the debtor, control disbursements, or hire new
management. 1 3
2. The Properties of Secured Loans. - If the relational financing model
is congruent with actual patterns of financing, then its key characteris-
tics should be observable notwithstanding creditors' reluctance to as-
sume operational control. In order to test this proposition, I begin by
isolating six core properties of the financing relationship described in
the model.
a. Firm-Specific Prospects. - The relational model is premised on the
assumption that, under certain circumstances, firms encounter unique
growth opportunities. 1 4 These opportunities are assumed to be spe-
cific to the enterprise: they cannot be traded on the market, and if not
developed by the firm they will be lost. Based on this first principle of
relational credit, one would expect debtors to issue security during pe-
riods characterized by such unique growth. This would include the fa-
miliar paradigm of rapid expansion, as well as financing for entirely
new ventures and for firms turning around from serious financial
setbacks.
b. The Lack of Alternative Financing. - Linked to the financing pros-
pect are the conditions that make security the optimal mechanism for
ensuring the prospect's development. The relational financing model
is premised on the high cost of alternative sources of financing relative
to the use of private debt."15 Were it not for these costs, equity financ-
ing, although presenting other conflicts, is a complete solution to the
problem of underinvestment. As an empirical guess, therefore, we
would expect to see security used to finance the small to medium sized
firm that has no realistic access to public markets or alternative sources
of financing.
c. Exclusive Financing. - The financial prospect can be developed
optimally only when a single creditor owns the exclusive rights to the
opportunity." 6 While that creditor might license complementary activ-
ities, the prospect function implies that there will be only one relational
financer for any debtor. Thus, for example, we should not expect to
see priority contests between a creditor holding a floating lien in the
debtor's accounts and inventory (a "general financer") and a creditor
financing the debtor's retail sales of inventory (a "floor plan fi-
nancer").' 17 Furthermore, a standard provision of such security agree-
ments would predictably include either a prepayment penalty or the
113. See Koch, supra note 107, at 803-07.
114. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
117. For a further discussion of the regulation of general financing and floor plan
lending see infra notes 185-219 and accompanying text.
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right of the creditor to terminate the relationship should the debtor
seek additional financing without permission.
d. Leverage and Discretion. - The relational financing model envi-
sions security as the leverage necessary to maximize a prospect's poten-
tial. 118 This means that a blanket security interest in the debtor's
presently held and after-acquired assets that covers all future advances
would be commonly agreed to in such debt contracts. Furthermore, a
creditor's leverage depends on discretionary financing obligations.
Thus, in addition, relational security agreements would predictably
grant the secured party broad discretion in making any future advances
to the enterprise. Provisions that specify that any and all future ad-
vances will be made without commitment, or specify that the lender will
advance funds up to a stated percentage of the collateral value should
be commonplace.
e. Active Policing. - Only by the pervasive policing of both the
debtor's assets and its business judgments can leverage be employed
successfully.' 9 Thus, one strong prediction of the relational financing
model is that secured financers will engage in broad and pervasive
monitoring of the debtor's business affairs. Indeed, we would expect
secured creditors to develop highly specialized skills as detectives and
watchmen.
f. Associated Financial and Investment Counseling. - Since one of the
major purposes of relational credit is to exploit unique opportunities
available to small firms, it follows that creditors should be eager to sup-
ply the guidance necessary to increase the prospect's success. 120 So-
phisticated business strategies are not internally available to such
debtors. They can be furnished, of course, from private management
consultants, but the quality of the service is more uniformly guaranteed
when the consultant shares a stake in the venture. Therefore, the activ-
ity of relational lending and financial management appears to be signif-
icantly linked. This implies that we should expect to see secured
creditors providing a full range of auxiliary management and consult-
ing services as part of the basic financing package.
Of course, none of these characteristics will be perfectly reflected
in any observed data. But if the relational financing model has predic-
tive power, at least the essential elements of relational financing should
be confirmed in observations of the actual operation of secured lending
markets.
3. The Properties of Unsecured Loans. - Relational theory provides
fewer clues about the essential characteristics of unsecured credit.
Nonetheless, some key observations can be made about the nature of
unsecured financing. Unlike the small firm that seeks relational financ-
ing, a large, vertically integrated firm can internalize financial manage-
118. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
119. See supra subsection I.C.5.b.
120. See supra subsection I.C.5.a.
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ment and investment policy so as to achieve a continuous financial
planning process. Economies of scale for the large firm make access to
public financial markets more attractive. The integrated firm thus can
finance growth opportunities in two ways that do not (at least formally)
involve security. First, the firm can avoid the conflicts over optimal de-
velopment of growth prospects by using new equity as the basis of
growth financing. Second, the integrated firm can issue unsecured debt
using its current cash flow (and "established track record") to obtain
unsecured loans. Because these financing options are cheaper to ad-
minister and police, relational theory predicts that these alternatives
will generally be preferable to secured debt.
Trade credit is another significant portion of unsecured debt. The
relational financing model suggests that trade creditors are among the
principal beneficiaries of both the prospecting and policing functions
performed by the secured creditor (although they clearly "pay" for this
service by taking an inferior position upon insolvency). Relational the-
ory predicts that such creditors will remain unsecured unless they can
participate in either of the functions that motivate security. The only
complementary service that will induce the relational financer to au-
thorize security for trade credit is the specialized policing of tangible
assets-such as equipment and large items of inventory-by the trade
supplier. 121 Other trade creditors cannot efficiently bargain for secur-
ity because they provide no compensating services to the venture. This
suggests that only those trade creditors who can easily take purchase
money security interests in tangible durables such as equipment or in-
ventory will appear in competition with relational creditors upon
default.
Singly or in combination, these several visions of private credit ar-
rangements yield determinant predictions that can be tested against the
observed data. In the following section, therefore, I marshal the avail-
able evidence on credit markets in order to subject the relational hy-
pothesis to some preliminary scrutiny.
B. Examining the Data: The Nature and Operation of Credit Markets
1. The Data Base. - It has been widely observed that current statis-
tics and quantitative data on the characteristics of business loans and
business borrowers are meager. Indeed, no comprehensive source of
current information on the amount and nature of secured lending is
available. 122 Thus, much of the available evidence is qualitative rather
121. Id.
122. The most recent quantitative data on secured financing derives from two stud-
ies of bank lending at member banks of the Federal Reserve system. These analyses were
based on loans outstanding on October 5, 1955 and October 16, 1957. See Fed. Res.
Bull. 327 (1956); Fed. Res. Bull. 393 (1958). While the dollar amount of outstanding
business loans had more than quadrupled by the early 1970's, most commentators be-
lieve that a current survey would show a broadly similar pattern. See P. Hunt, C. Wil-
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than quantitative. As a preliminary step towards more rigorous testing
of the relational theory, I assembled the following data base. First, I
gathered macro data on all year-end outstanding loans of insured com-
mercial banks from 1939 to 1982.123 The data reveals the dollar
amount of loans secured by various business assets as a percentage of
the total outstanding and the annual fluctuations in these patterns. 124
The primary benefit of this quantitative data is the evidence of consis-
tency in the use of security in bank borrowing since the latest Federal
Reserve study of business loans in 1958.125
Second, I surveyed all of the relevant business literature from 1965
through 1985 that purported to describe the actual operation and dy-
namics of secured and unsecured private lending. This survey was sup-
plemented by personal interviews with financial officers at six lending
institutions and a random sampling of firms that use private financing
to secure their short-term needs. The analysis of the business literature
includes industry and government studies, both qualitative and quanti-
tative, as well as industry analyses of unsecured and secured credit. In
this latter group are articles written by both lenders and borrowers.
They range from straight-forward descriptions of the financing envi-
ronment to normative, or prescriptive, analyses of the participants in
financing agreements. Both types of articles serve as excellent primary
sources of information on the specific perceptions and strategies
adopted by those parties whose business activities are the central focus
of Article 9's regulation. In addition, the industry analysis reveals
much of the evolutionary pattern of private financing: which institu-
tions historically have used secured debt, which purport to use it now,
and what accounts for the changes.
As a third source of data, I examined the standard form security
agreements used by over a dozen commercial banks and commercial
finance companies. This exercise served to identify and isolate those
contractual provisions that are persisently used in conventional security
arrangements. Finally, I collected and evaluated 153 reported cases in-
volving priority disputes between Article 9 secured creditors both
before and after bankruptcy proceedings had begun.126 While the
liams & G. Donaldson, Basic Business Finance 211 (4th ed. 1971). In order to confirm
this belief, I gathered data on year-end outstanding loans of insured commercial banks,
both secured and unsecured, from 1939 to 1982. These data reveal no dramatic
changes in the past twenty-five years that would impeach the Federal Reserve's findings.
See infra appendix A. Thus, where relevant, the Federal Reserve data will be reported
as at least suggestive of current patterns in secured financing.
123. See infra appendix A.
124. The data report the percentage of outstanding loans secured by publicly-
traded securities, "commercial and industrial" assets, real estate, and retail automobiles.
See infra appendix A.
125. See supra note 122.
126. The sample of 153 reported cases was drawn by first collecting every decision
reported in the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service between 1964 and 1985
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cases are in no sense a random population, they provide primary evi-
dence of the kinds of financing patterns employed by debtors who be-
come financially troubled. Assuming that the population of financially
troubled debtors does not deviate significantly from the general popu-
lation of firms seeking private financing, the cases are useful supple-
mentary data concerning the operation of certain financing
mechanisms.
In combination, these sources reveal that distinct, identifiable pat-
terns of secured financing persist. Observing persistent institutions
yields important empirical evidence. Of course, this evidence is useful
only if it distinguishes among competing hypotheses. In the conclud-
ing sections, therefore, I use this data not only to evaluate the validity
of relational theory, but also as a point of comparison against other,
competing explanations of secured debt.
2. The Supply Side: Secured Debtors and Their Financing Environment.
a. The Characteristics of Secured Debtors. - Current statistics on the
charactei'istics of business loans and business borrowers are incom-
plete. But available data supplemented with impressionistic reports
yield the following picture. Most secured debt is issued by relatively
small, young and growing firms. 127 In the most recent Federal Reserve
study, for example, only eighteen percent of the loans made to busi-
nesses with assets above $100,000,000 were secured, while seventy-
eight percent of the loans to firms with assets of $50,000 to $250,000
were secured. 128 The credit industry believes this credit pattern arises
because small and relatively young firms are not as able to raise money
in the capital market, nor to generate additional financing internally, as
that involved a priority dispute under Article 9 and then eliminating all cases involving
either crops or consumer goods as collateral. The remaining cases were categorized
according to the financing patterns employed by the disputants.
127. See H. Gross, Financing for Small and Medium Sized Businesses 133 (1969);
E. Reed, Commercial Bank Management 265 (1963); Gillette, Revitalizing the American
Dream: Banking's Commitment to Small BusinessJ. Com. Bank Lending,June 1982, at
2, 3; Goldman, Look to Receivables and Other Assets to Obtain Working Capital, 57
Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov. 1979, at 206, 208. Manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and con-
struction and service companies are generally thought to be the predominant users of
secured financing. See D. Jacobs, L. Farwell & E. Neave, Financial Institutions 380-81
(5th ed. 1972).
128. Fed. Res. Bull. 403 (1958). The Federal Reserve Study disclosed that while
secured loans represent 66.8% of the total number of business loans, they only accounted
for 50.3% of the total amount of bank credit to business. Id. The lower dollar amount
percentage is evidence that most larger loans are unsecured and that the use of security
varies inversely with the size of the debtor firm. The current data on outstanding com-
mercial and industrial loans do not reveal firm size, and thus any confidence that the
Federal Reserve report reflects current patterns must rest on the fact that the percent-
age of loans secured by commercial and industrial assets remained relatively stable from
1959 to 1982. In 1959, commercial and industrial secured loans were 36.31% of the
dollar amount of outstanding commercial loans; in 1982 such secured loans were 37%
of outstanding commercial loans. See infra appendix A.
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are large and established firms.129 As a result, such firms cannot offer
prospective lenders proof of capable management or a solid base of
existing assets, but they can offer the assets to be realized from future
business activity. This correlation between the supply of secured debt
and the size of the debtor appears to cut across all types of business
activity and industries.' 30
How does the business environment of secured debtors differ from
firms that issue predominantly unsecured debt? The entrepreneur of
the small firm cannot exploit the economies of scale necessary to seek
continuing counsel from various specialists on the advisibility and ex-
pected effects of financial decisions.' 3 ' Thus, the owner/manager of a
small firm operates in many managerial roles simultaneously and is
often unable to devote the time and resources necessary to a continu-
ous financial planning process.' 3 2 This high cost of continuous finan-
cial planning makes it extremely difficult for the owner/manager to
provide a smooth flow of growth capital to the small and developing
company. As a result, the evidence suggests that the typical growth
company moves through a series of financial crises during periods of
rapid growth.' 3 3 In addition to financing business expansion, 34 there-
fore, industry reports indicate that secured lending plays a major role
in both acquisition financing and turn-around financing.'3 5 One source
estimates that up to one-third of the debtors financed by secured lend-
ers are either acquiring a new business or alleviating financial pressure
by moving into new markets.' 3 6
The evidence from industry sources that secured debtors share
129. See D. Jacobs, L. Farwell & E. Neave, supra note 127, at 443-53; E. Reed,
supra note 114, at 267-68. The financial markets used by large publicly held firms to
arrange new equity or long-termp debt financing require a substantial investment in pro-
fessional services that deters entry by many small firms. Furthermore, small firms usu-
ally lack a long record of satisfactory earnings, as well as the opportunity to build up
their assets from retained earnings. Id.
130. The proportion of secured loans measured by amount is larger for the whole-
saling, retailing, construction, and service industries which are characterized by many
small and medium-sized firms. Thus, for example, the Federal Reserve study reported
that in 1957 63.6%o of loans to retail firms, 74.6%5 of loans to commodity dealers, 70%6
of the loans to service firms, and 67.9%6 of the loans to construction firms were secured.
On the other hand, only 37.5%6 of the loans to manufacturing and mining firms were
secured. See Fed. Res. Bull. 1114-17 (1959).
131. Bund, The Roles of a Consultant and a Lender in the Emergence of a Growing
Business,J. Com. Bank Lending, April 1981, at 38, 39; Gillette, supra note 127, at 5-7.
132. Blair, How Bankers Can Assist Developing Companies in Growth Manage-
ment, J. Com. Bank Lending, June 1982, at 36, 37.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 38-39; Gillette, supra note 127, at 3; Kaye, supra note 54, at 17.
135. Reisman, What the Commercial Lawyer Should Know About Commercial Fi-
nance and Factoring, 79 Com. L.J. 146 (1974).
136. D.Jacobs, L. Farwell & E. Neave, supra note 127, at 383-84; Goldman, Asset-
based Lenders' Role in Saving Banks' Struggling Borrowers, Am. Bankers A. BankingJ.,
July 1981, at 97, 97.
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certain common characteristics is supported by a review of the Article 9
priority cases. Over ninety percent of the debtors involved in priority
disputes that were litigated under Article 9 appeared to be small to me-
dium-sized firms using secured credit to finance business expansion,
seasonal or cyclical sales patterns, turnarounds, or new acquisitions. 137
b. Analysis. - Relational theory predicts that credit markets are
segmented by size and business conditions. The relational financing
model suggests that smaller firms presented with growth opportunities
issue secured debt as the most effective means of developing their fi-
nancing prospects. The relational theory accounts, therefore, for many
of the variations in debtor characteristics that are reported by industry
analysts, as well as for the evidence gleaned from decided cases. To the
contrary, competing hypotheses yield no determinate predictions con-
cerning either the size or the business needs of secured debtors. Under
the conventional monitoring cost explanation, for example, security is
conceived as reducing monitoring costs by providing focal points for
the monitoring activities of the secured creditor and by permitting
competitors to exploit comparative monitoring advantages. Neither of
these factors would appear to be positively related either to the size of
the firm or to the nature of the venture for which secured financing is
sought.
The zero-sum hypothesis, on the other hand, is premised on the
implicit assumption that contracting costs are largely insignificant to
the firm's capital structure. Instead, this hypothesis looks either to in-
formation barriers or to exogenous factors such as taxes and bank-
ruptcy costs. Information-based explanations of security are, however,
inconsistent with the observed characteristics of secured debtors as re-
ported by industry sources and as revealed in the cases. A distribu-
tional explanation predicts that large firms will issue security in order
to exploit information asymmetries that prevent other creditors from
adjusting their rates to account for increased risk.l38 Yet, the converse
appears to be true. Similarly, a signalling explanation predicts that
firms issue security to reduce the costs of screening for good credit
risks. But if firm size has any relation to the riskiness of the firm's debt,
it is likely to be a negative correlation. Thus, the zero-sum hypothesis
is embarrassed by the fact that the predominant issuers of security are
small firms. Exogenous factors such as taxes and bankruptcy costs ap-
pear to bear no relation to the patterns of secured credit that this evi-
dence reveals. At least insofar as the data suggest that security is
segmented along firm size and business ventures, therefore, the rela-
tional hypothesis proves far richer than its competitors.
137. See Analysis of Reported Cases on file with the author. The determination of
firm size was admittedly impressionistic based upon the information revealed in the
cases. It is also plausible that small or medium-sized firms suffer business reversals
more frequently and thus are disproportionately represented in the reported cases.
138. See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 565.
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3. The Demand Side: Creditor Perspectives on Secured Debt.
a. The Evolution of Specialized Private Financing. - In the early period
of American banking, most loans were secured. As the economy be-
came more industrialized in the 19th century, corporate forms of enter-
prise became more popular. During this period, corporate stocks and
bonds, equipment, inventory, and receivables all became acceptable
forms of collateral.1 39 But in the early 20th century, as business in-
comes became more stable and accounting procedures and financial re-
porting were improved and regularized, unsecured loans became more
prevalent. Perhaps the most important factor contributing to the
growth of unsecured lending by commercial banks was the evolution of
sophisticated financial analysis. By the study and comparison of past
financial statements, financial accountants could, with reasonable accu-
racy, evaluate the financial structures and liquidity of a borrower. Fur-
thermore, these techniques produced reliable projections of the
continued solvency and income-generating ability of the borrower.1 40
Secured lending through commercial finance companies became
an important industry as the country emerged from the depression
when many firms experiencing rapid growth lacked working capital but
had the ability to produce and market a viable product. 14 1 The value of
these businesses was based primarily on future prospects which under
conventional financial analysis were not credit-worthy bases for lend-
ing. 142 Commercial banks, largely specialized to unsecured loans, were
not responsive to the increased demand for credit.' 43 Instead, the
commercial finance companies borrowed funds from the commercial
banks on an unsecured basis and lent them to the new growth busi-
nesses as secured debt.
Beginning in 1960, commercial banks began to enter this market
aggressively. 144 Currently, asset-based financing is dominated by a few
139. E. Reed, supra note 127, at 180.
140. Id.; Stock, Asset-Based Financing: Borrower and Lender Perspectives, J.
Com. Bank Lending, (Dec. 1980), at 31, 38-39. This trend continued through the 1960s
by which time the largest loans and greatest dollar volume of loans made by commercial
banks were on an unsecured basis. In 1957, almost one-half of the commercial bank
loans in dollar amount were unsecured. See Fed. Res. Bull. 403 (1958).
141. The industry, however, did not evidence dramatic growth until after World
War II when the United States experienced a sharp increase in the number of small
businesses requiring specialized financial assistance. See C. Phelps, Accounts Receiva-
ble Financing as a Method of Securing Business Loans 74-75 (2d ed. 1961).
142. See Diamond, Asset-Based Lending-The Role of the Bank and the Finance
Company, J. Com. Bank Lending, Sept. 1978, at 38, 39.
143. One source suggests that bank reluctance to enter the market for secured
loans derived from "the banking industry's apprehension about its legal position .... its
unwillingness to perform the necessary policing and perhaps because of the stigma asso-
ciated with this type of lending." See D. Robinson, Accounts Receivable and Inventory
Lending 3-4 (1977).
144. See Abraham, Factoring-The New Frontier for Commercial Banks, J. Com.
Bank Lending, Apr. 1981, at 32; Shay & Greer, Banks Move Into High-Risk Commercial
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national finance companies, large commercial banks with national cov-
erage and an increasing number of regional banks. While asset-based
lending is thus rapidly becoming available throughout the banking in-
dustry, the initial specialization of the activities between secured and
unsecured components remains. Lenders retain the distinction be-
tween the reliance on sound financial analysis for unsecured loans and
reliance on sound "collateral administration" for secured loans.145
What remains after the integration of the private financing industry,
therefore, are lenders holding a financial portfolio of both unsecured
and secured loans premised on the existence of an inverse relationship
between a borrower's balance sheet strength and the benefits of collat-
eral control.
b. The Function of Collateral. - What function do creditors believe
collateral performs in the current credit market? The traditional con-
ception of security is that it reduces risk by giving the creditor a priority
claim to specific assets in the event of default. 146 This conception is not
widely shared among industry analysts, however. Lenders frequently
note that they are not content to realize on defaulted loans by foreclo-
sure proceedings even where repayment is assured. 147 One bank of-
ficer reports: "No bank I know would make a loan against a basket of
gold bricks if there was a good chance it would have to sell the
bricks."' 48 Lenders report that in pricing the transaction they do not
Financing, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1968, at 149, 152. Two factors can be seen as
contributing to the market shift. First, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
eased the costs of creating and maintaining a security interest in personal property. Sec-
ond, the banks began to suffer a significant decline in their market share owing to the
increased share of business loans attracted to commercial finance companies. The move
to secured financing was accomplished in several ways. Some banks restructured their
relationship with commercial finance companies from a debtor-creditor relationship to a
co-venturer status, thus spawning the concept of "participation" financing. In addition,
a number of large banks integrated commercial finance subsidiaries to handle secured
loans.
145. This distinction reflects the historic notion that unsecured debt is related di-
rectly to a borrower's current financial statement, since the lender looks to current ratios
and net worth to evaluate its risk. Secured debt, on the other hand, remains linked to
the quality of the available collateral and the borrower's ability to gereate sufficient cash
flow out of future business activity. Diamond, supra note 142, at 39; Donahue,
Cornwell, Rubinstein & Rubin, How to Realize on Collateral, J. Com. Bank Lending,
Jan. 1976, at 44; Goldman, supra note 127, at 206, 208; Kaye, supra note 54, at 20.
146. See, e.g., P. Hunt, C. Williams & G. Donaldson, supra note 122, at 269; E.
Reed, supra note 127, at 168; supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
147. See Diamond, Asset-Based Lending in a Changing Environment,J. Com. Bank
Lending, May 1981, at 42, 45; Diamond, supra note 142, at 44; Diamond, Secured
Loans: Exploding the Myth of High-RiskJ. Com. Bank Lending, May 1973, at 2, 5 ("an
unpoliced Code lien adds nothing to the strength of the credit"); Lewin, Secured Lend-
ing in Bank Credit 116, 126 (1981); Q.uarles, The Floating Lien-Its Creation and
Adaptability from the Commercial Banker's Standpoint, J. Com. Bank Lending, Nov.
1970, at 51, 57.
148. Statement by Richard S. Behler, Executive Vice-President of First Wisconsin
National Bank of Milwaukee ("banks aren't pawnshops") (Mar. 1982).
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principally rely on recovery of the collateral upon default.149
Why, then, do lenders take collateral on their loans? The most
frequent answer to this question is that having a secured loan is a psy-
chological advantage for a lender. As long as the borrower has greater
equity in the pledged assets than does the lender, and the lender can
foreclose if any loan covenants are breached, the borrower has a strong
incentive to fulfill all obligations specified in the agreement. 150 Secur-
ity thus provides protection against errors of judgment on the part of
the debtor. Debtors may take improper risks or fail to pursue business
opportunities skillfully. Creditors believe that security is useful in caus-
ing the borrower to weigh carefully the consequences of such wrongful
or careless business actions. 15 ' The primary value of collateral is thus
thought to be the strong negotiating position that it gives to the se-
cured creditor. 15 2
While this leverage function is the dominant conception of security
among private lenders, other rationales are offered as complementary
explanations. Perhaps most frequently cited is the belief that by taking
security the lender limits the ability of the debtor to engage in subse-
quent financing. This "defensive" conception of security suggests that
if the bank does not take collateral, the asset will be made available for
subsequent loans to other creditors.' 53 On more careful reflection,
however, it can be seen that the defensive explanation is really only a
subset of the leverage notion. What motivates a defensive secured
transaction is the belief that subsequent creditors will, by taking secur-
ity, occupy the dominant position of influence over the subsequent
business affairs of the debtor.'54
149. See, e.g., Citibank, A Synopsis of Policies and Guidelines Governing the
Credit Process of Citibank, Citicorp and Their Subsidiaries 64 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter
Citibank Guidelines]. Among other credit policies, Citicorp recommends to its loan of-
ficers: "[In pricing] don't regard collateral as a substitute for repayment-loans must be
repaid from the flow of cash." Id.
150. See H. Crosse & G. Hempel, Management Policies for Commercial Banks (3d
ed. 1980) ("The borrower does lose a part of its ability to function if the bank takes over
its assets. This ... encourages it to meet its obligations."); E. Reed, supra note 127, at
168; E. Reed, R. Cottor, E. Gill & R. Smith, Commercial Banking 237 (2d ed. 1980)
(secured loan is a pyschological advantage producing strong incentives to repay); Ci-
tibank Guidelines, supra note 149, at 63-64 (Security "places the lender in a stronger
negotiating position because the assets are usually necessary to operate the business.").
151. See supra note 150.
152. Citibank Guidelines, supra note 149, at 64 ("Three factors must be considered
in evaluating collateral: control, marketability and margin."); Sinclair, Problem Loans-
At the Eyeball-to-Eyeball Level, J. Com. Bank Lending, June 1975, at 29, 35 ("If you are
going to invest more money in a troubled business, for heaven's sake install new
management.").
153. See Hunn, Big Trouble-Managing Major Problem Loans, 158 Bankers Mag.
22, 27 (1975); Citibank Guidelines, supra note 149, at 64; cf. H. Crosse & G. Hempel,
supra note 150, at 186-87, 190-91 (discussing "protective" reasons for a creditor to
take security).
154. Hunn, supra note 153, at 27:
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c. Monitoring Activities. - The apparent connection between the
risk of misbehavior and the risk of business failure is well understood
by both commercial banks and commercial finance companies. 15 5 It is
when the borrower is in financial straits that lenders believe the tempta-
tion to violate loan covenants arises. 156 Therefore, it is an article of
faith in the industry that the cornerstone of any effective secured loan is
monitoring the financial condition and health of the borrower.15 7
Because the risk of misbehavior heightens in circumstances of busi-
ness stress, 158 the industry follows well-established standards of proce-
dure for monitoring the collateral. Collateral control requires close
supervision of the covered assets. In the case of receivables financing,
for example, the lender insures that real customers are paying the ac-
count and periodically inspects the debtor's books to verify receivable
agings, books, and records.' 5 9 Floor plan lenders typically exercise
even closer control over the collateral. The risk of conversion of inven-
tory or double financing in such markets requires frequent investiga-
tions of the condition, quality, and maintenance of the collateral.1 60
The real value of the collateral is as a profit-generating engine to the owners of
the business and, therefore, they are most responsive to the leverage that a
collateral holding bank has. In essence, the bank lender is interested in pre-
cluding other parties from getting this collateral and thereby exercising its all-
important leverage on the troubled borrower.
155. The industry believes that the major source of loss in secured financing is not
insolvency but misbehavior. The evidence for this assertion is anecdotal, but widely
accepted in the industry nonetheless. See, e.g., Biborosch, Floor Plan Financing, 77
Banking L.J. 725, 735-39 (1960); Hunn & Schwartz, Problem Loans in Perspective,
Bankers Mag., Summer 1973, at 42, 43; Miller, Taking a Look at the Commercial Fi-
nance Contract, 65 A.B.A.J. 628 (1979); Reisman, supra note 135, at 150; Rutberg, Ten
Cents on the Dollar or the Bankruptcy Game (1973); Business Frauds, Their Perpetra-
tion Detection and Redress, 20 Bus. Law. 83 (1964).
156. A typical candidate for misbehavior is seen as the debtor who, for one reason
or another, has reached the limits of its line of credit and is in a financial bind. For
instance, conversion or asset substitution may begin by the assignment of anticipated
accounts receivable when the goods are not yet ready for shipment. Subsequently, it can
evolve to the assignment of spurious accounts. See, e.g., D. Robinson, Accounts Receiv-
able and Inventory Lending 126 (1977) (fraud comes when a previously honest busi-
nessman is put under pressure because of a series of losses); Donahue, Cornwall,
Rubenstein & Rubin, How to Realize on Collateral,J. Com. Bank LendingJan. 1976, at
44; Quill, Cresci & Shuter, Some Considerations About Secured Lending, J. Com. Bank
Lending, Apr. 1977, at 41, 42 ("The most honorable borrower will exploit every loop-
hole or flaw when faced with a desperate struggle to survive . ); Reisman, supra
note 135, at 150.
157. Donahue, Cornwall, Rubenstein & Rubin, supra note 156, at 49.
158. A widely cited rationale for incipient fraud is that management "hold[s] firmly
to the 'miracle concept,' steadfastly believing that the next day the corporation will turn
the operating corner, sell an important property, or become the bride in a heaven-sent
merger." Hunn & Schwartz, supra note 155, at 43.
159. See, e.g., Donahue, Cornwall, Rubenstein & Rubin, supra note 156, at 50;
Quill, Cresci & Shuter, supra note 156, at 52-53; Reisman, supra note 135, at 150.
160. Donahue, Cornwall, Rubenstein & Rubin, supra note 156, at 51 ("Inventory
financing... often requires added administrative techniques and closer supervision.").
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Even more striking is the evidence that creditors routinely monitor
the debtor's business affairs apart from the collateral. As a standard
practice, general financing lenders engage in extensive investigation of
the debtor's business operations. 161 Creditors typically explain these
actions as a necessary part of the financial relationship.' 6 2 Many lend-
ers believe they have management tools available to assist borrowers in
making decisions to remedy financial difficulties. 163 Broadly based
monitoring of business practices typically requires reports of purchase
orders, sales, disbursements, and total receipts. I 6 Such supervision
will provide the secured lender with more information than is generally
available to trade creditors. As long as the information is not used to
dictate decisions for the borrower, monitoring the business operations
is a relatively safe form of intervention that does not risk the problem
of operational control. If the financial stress deepens, however, general
financing lenders are prepared to exercise much more coercive lever-
age by, for example, replacing management, introducing third party
consultants, controlling disbursements, joining the board of directors,
and in extreme cases, even exercising voting control of a borrower's
stock.' 65
The practice of monitoring both the collateral and the debtor's
business operations is reflected in the terms of the standard form secur-
ity agreement used to support many general financing loans. The stan-
dard agreement requires the debtor on request to supply audited
161. See Colton, Legal Implications of Actions Taken by Lenders Against Troubled
Borrowers, J. Com. Bank Lending, Aug. 1981, at 35, 42-45 (discussing the range of
supervision of debtor's business affairs in ascending order of risk of controller liability:
monitoring daily operations especially sales and disbursements; replacing management;
controlling disbursements; joining the board of directors; exercising voting control; in-
sisting on hiring a consultant); Donahue, Cornwall, Rubenstein & Rubin, supra note
156, at 52 (the financial condition of the borrower should be continuously monitored);
id. at 49 (must constantly be on the alert for product and marketing changes).
162. See, e.g., Colton, supra note 161, at 46.
If the lender is stepping in to stop improper disbursements, and there is no
favoritism to the lender, liabilities will probably not arise, and, in fact, the
lender will be assisting everyone. Financial domination can extend far beyond
the controlling of disbursements, however. It can be intertwined with other
controls. For example, a lender can demand that unless specific business plans
are put into effect, the lender will call its loan. The ongoing provision of work-
ing capital by the lender is so essential to the borrower's survival that whatever
the lender says is done.
Id.
163. Struck & Glassman, Commercial Banking and the Small Business Sector: Ob-
servations from a SurveyJ. Com. Bank Lending, Feb. 1983, at 21, 26 (financial counsel-
ing, referrals to technical assistance, and referrals to management assistance are all
considered nonfee services that the majority of banks surveyed provided); The Institute
of Bankers, The Banks and Small Businesses 70 (1978) (most banks provide managerial
assistance and advice to small businesses).
164. Colton, supra note 161, at 42 ("[e]ven daily reports of sales, disbursements,
and receipts can be appropriate and reasonable").
165. Id. at 42-45.
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financial statements and to cooperate in periodic "field" examinations
which include, in addition to inspections of the collateral, a review of
the borrower's business and financial conditions and an evaluation of
immediate and near-term business prospects.' 66 The evidence of how
secured lenders actually monitor their loans reveals, therefore, that an
awareness of the debtor's business operations and financial condition is
deemed essential to the success of the venture.
d. The Debtor-Creditor Relationship. - It is clear from the available
data that lenders and borrowers alike believe successful secured financ-
ing involves a long-term borrower-lender relationship. 167 A vice presi-
dent of the Chase Manhattan Bank, for example, asserts that "a banker
should act almost in the position of a partner."' 68 From the debtor's
point of view, the financing relationship provides the firm with expert
financial and business guidance and access to sophisticated financial
services. 169 Commercial lenders are uniquely qualified to assist in the
management of a secured debtor because lenders are exposed to many
different business settings. The breadth of this exposure provides the
creditor with extensive management expertise that can be applied to
specific problem solving. Perhaps most significantly, the creditor may
be better able to identify potential financial opportunities that call for
growth and expansion.170
From the creditor's perspective, a long-term relationship enables
the creditor to economize on information search and processing
costs. 17 1 In addition, the relational creditor can use its superior knowl-
edge of the debtor's general financial prospects to minimize its risks by
supplying critical operational judgments when needed. Many commer-
cial banks, for example, routinely provide both financial and manage-
ment advice to business firms. 172 In a recent survey, three-quarters of
166. See Standard Form Commercial Finance Agreement 5.3-.4 (on file at the
offices of the Columbia Law Review); Standard Form Accounts Financing Security
Agreement 5a-f (on file at the offices of the Columbia Law Review); see also Miller,
supra note 155, at 629 (commercial finance agreement may require "reports of certified
public accountants satisfactory to the lender" and "periodic confirmation of
receivables").
167. Bund, The Roles of a Consultant and a Lender in the Emergence of a Growing
Business, J. Com. Bank Lending, Apr. 1981, at 38, 42-43; Kenzie, A Savings Banker
Looks at Commercial Lending, J. Com. Bank Lending, Apr. 1981, at 31, 32; The Insti-
tute of Bankers, supra note 163, at 70.
168. Dramatic Changes in Bank Services, Fin. Executive, May 1967, at 14, 55 (state-
ment of Adam C. Heck, Vice-President of the Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.).
169. H. Gross, supra note 127, at 130; Bund, supra note 167, at 42-43.
170. See H. Gross, supra note 127, at 133; Bund, supra note 167, at 42.
171. Kenzie, supra note 167, at 31, 35; Struck & Glassman, supra note 168, at 25.
172. "A Dun & Bradstreet study of over 11,000 business failures which occurred
during the 1975 recession showed that a full 34% were the result of mismanagement of
operating expenses, receivables, and inventory. While a Banker can't be expected to
run a customer's business . . .we can carefully monitor performance and head off
problems before they occur. Regular meetings should be held to review income, receiv-
ables, and inventories." Gillette, supra note 127, at 5-7; see also R. Rubin & P.
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the responding banks indicated that they made special efforts to ac-
comodate small business borrowers by providing financial counseling
and referrals to technical and management assistance as "nonfee serv-
ices." 173 As part of their cash management services, most commercial
banks now offer comprehensive analysis of customer receipts and dis-
bursements, as well as credit information, market analysis, financial
management assistance, and production advice. 174 In fact, the advisory
capabilities of secured lenders are such that "growth" and "turn-
around" financing is now a significant part of the loan portfolio of most
private lenders.1 75
A creditor's willingness to offer valuable business counseling as
part of a fixed price financing package depends on the creditor's ability
to capture the benefits from such business management. Thus a neces-
sary adjunct to the provision of management services is control over
the financial venture. There is substantial evidence that general financ-
ing lenders demand such strategic control as a condition of the financ-
ing relationship. 176  The standard commercial finance security
agreement, for example, states that the lender will act as the borrower's
"sole source of financing." 177 The exclusive financing hypothesis is
strongly confirmed by the reported cases. Less than five percent of the
reported cases involve debtors who had developed a general financing
relationship with more than one creditor. 178 Although disputes be-
Goldberg, The Small Business Guide to Borrowing Money 70 (1980) (according to a
Federal Reserve Study, managerial assistance is an integral, often indispensible, part of
successful bank management of small business secured loans); Bund, supra note 167, at
42 (The breadth of exposure and the knowledge that is passed from situation to situa-
tion provide the lender with extensive management information that can be applied to
the debtor's problems.); Lott & Myers, Secured Lending in The Banker's Handbook
622, 626 (1978) ("Every banker has an obligation to be as knowledgeable as possible
about the customer's business and to give a borrower the benefit of his advice.").
173. Struck & Glassman, supra note 163, at 26. The survey, conducted in Septem-
ber 1981, consisted of personal interviews with bank officers in a nationwide random
sample of 224 banks. A copy of the survey is on file at the offices of the Columbia Law
Review.
174. E. Compton, Inside Commercial Banking 339-40 (1980); D.Jacobs, L. Farwell
& E. Neave, supra note 127, at 379.
175. See Goldman, supra note 136, at 97 (The ability of an asset-based lender to
enable a small, under-capitalized firm to take advantage of a market opportunity and
grow more profitably than it could under the constraints of unsecured financing reflects
the unusual leveraging power provided by accounts receivable and inventory financing.).
176. See Quill, Cresci & Shuter, supra note 156, at 48 (If a lender does not want a
purchase money interest to exist, the loan documents should prohibit them. Then if
such an interest is discovered, the lender can insist on its removal or call the loan.);
Struck & Glassman, supra note 163, at 25 (small businesses are more likely to have a
principal financing relationship with just one bank).
177. See Commercial Finance Security Agreement on file with the author; Miller,
supra note 155, at 628.
178. There are very few disputes between parties who engage in relational financ-
ing for the same debtor. Out of 153 cases surveyed, in only six could such a conflict be
identified. To be sure, because some cases do not fully explain the secured creditor's
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tween general financers and floor plan financers could conceivably arise
over competing claims to a debtor's inventory, such contests are not
empirically significant. Relational financers appear to insist on being in
sole control of the venture. The priority contests that do materialize,
therefore, involve the relational financer in competition with comple-
mentary or associated creditors such as trade suppliers, mortgagees
and purchase money security holders of equipment or inventory. 179
e. Analysis. - An analysis of the demand for secured debt reveals
four critical features that characterize the market for asset-based financ-
ing. These features indicate the close congruence between the proper-
ties of relational credit and the operation of these financial markets.
First, secured financing as a credit institution has evolved into a highly
specialized industry. The servicing costs of secured loans extend well
beyond the transaction costs of establishing a priority position under
the Code. The returns to the secured creditor can only be realized by a
sophisticated administration of the collateral and of the debtor's under-
lying business prospects. Firms that are able to provide these services
have evolved as specialized lending institutions. While competitive
markets have caused the composition of firms demanding secured debt
to change, the specialization between secured and unsecured debt
remains.
Second, the function of secured credit is conceived within the in-
dustry as enabling the creditor to influence debtor actions prior to the
onset of business failure. This conception is markedly different in ef-
fect from the traditional vision of collateral as a residual asset claim
upon default and insolvency. Security is taken for its active rather than
its passive properties. Only through this unique leveraging device can
firms be induced to fully pursue the business strategy that motivated
the initial loan.
Third, the leveraging explains why many secured creditors monitor
more pervasively than the conventional focal-point hypothesis would
suggest. In order to affect the kinds of influences necessary to realize
the full benefits from a financing opportunity, these lenders carefully
police both the collateral and the underlying business operations of the
role, it is often necessary to make inferences from available facts. Thus, this evidence
should be taken as suggestive only. In the six cases which appear to involve two credi.
tors who serve, or could serve, as relational lenders, four involve obvious filing search
errors in which the secured lender did not known of the first creditor or believed the
first creditor only had an interest in particular collateral. See Analysis of Reported
Cases, on file with the author.
179. See, e.g., Greg Restaurant Equip. & Supplies, Inc. v. Valway, 144 Vt. 59, 472
A.2d 1241 (1984) (general financer versus purchase money supplier of equipment);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Detroit Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 79 Mich. App. 378, 262
N.W.2d 831 (1977) (general financer versus purchase money supplier of inventory);
Community Bank v. Jones, 278 Or. 647, 566 P.2d 470 (1977) (floor plan financer has
priority on future advances over subsequent purchase money supplier who failed prop.
erly to protect its interest).
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debtor. The two activities are linked in a common purpose. Policing
the collateral enables the creditor to steer the business operations at
key junctures. But the business operations can be charted only if the
underlying business conditions are known to the creditor.
Finally, the purposes behind this elaborate mechanism are re-
vealed by evidence that secured creditors and debtors form a relational
contract in order to finance growth opportunities or prospects. Se-
cured creditors invest substantial resources in directing debtor actions
toward optimal development of the financing venture. Since these
services are not separately priced at the time of contracting, the parties
enter into relational credit contracts in which the creditor gains the ex-
clusive option over the financing venture in exchange for the obligation
to aid in its full development. The creditor's interest in cooperating ex
post is maintained by the single fact that the loans cannot feasibly be
repaid except out of the proceeds of the venture itself. The debtors
commitment to the joint interests of the venture is itself enforced
through the elaborate security mechanisms generated by this special-
ized industry.
This evidence of the evolving patterns of secured debt provides
powerful support for the basic conception underlying the relational fi-
nancing model. To be sure, some puzzling anomalies remain. A strong
prediction of the exclusive financing hypothesis is that provisions for
prepayment penalties commonly will be used in debt contracts. Such
devices link the parties' interests and thus encourage the creditor to use
its best efforts to develop the growth prospect fully. Yet such provi-
sions are seldom observed in standard form debt contracts. It is possi-
ble, of course, that search costs sufficiently deter debtors from
exercising their option to terminate the financing relationship thus ren-
dering prepayment penalties superfluous. 180 However, these and other
continuing puzzles-such as the function of real estate security-sug-
gest the wisdom of further research.
The data do permit some tentative evaluations of the predictive
power of relational theory and its rival hypotheses. The conventional
monitoring cost explanation correctly predicts financing patterns-
such as purchase money security interests-in which security is taken in
specific assets as a focal point for monitoring efforts. However, the fo-
cal point theory, standing alone, is not helpful in accounting for other
persistent patterns including the monitoring of business operations and
the leverage function of the floating lien and other general financing
arrangements. Thus, the relational framework can be best understood
as providing a context within which monitoring theory can more suc-
cessfully withstand critical scrutiny.
180. Termination requires the debtor to search for alternative financing. Further-
more, terminating the initial financing relationship inevitably causes coordination and
change of command problems for the debtor. See infra note 192.
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This conclusion is not undermined by the argument that combin-
ing two inadequate (or partial) explanations will not yield a more com-
plete general theory. Relational theory and the monitoring cost
explanation are wholly consistent, complementary themes that elabo-
rate the basic costly contracting hypothesis. The general theory holds
that security cements relationships that provide unique benefits to the
venture. To be sure, the nature of these benefits may vary in different
contexts. But in each instance the data are consistent with the hypothe-
sis that contractual mechanisms which control debtor-creditor conflict
can increase the value of the firm.
The zero-sum hypothesis, on the other hand, is unhelpful in ex-
plaining why the private lending markets have developed in the ways
that they have. The exogenous factors emphasized by the zero-sum hy-
pothesis-the costs of information, taxes and bankruptcy-have no ap-
parent correlation to any of the observed properties of secured debt.
Furthermore, these variables are not made any more relevant by the
introduction of the relational model, because their explanatory power
is not improved. This rudimentary empirical inquiry thus provides ad-
ditional evidence of the relative superiority of the costly contracting hy-
pothesis in explaining the observable patterns of certain financial
institutions.
III. SOME APPLICATIONS: RELATIONAL THEORY AND ARTICLE 9
The relational financing model purports to explain how security
actually functions in certain financing relationships. Closely linked to
this positive analysis -of security is a related concern: Does relational
theory rationalize the contemporary legal regulation of secured trans-
actions? This question is particularly acute in light of the peculiar
drafting history of Article 9. Unlike other provisions of the Code, no
preexisting codification of secured transactions served to guide the
drafters of Article 9.181 Thus, Article 9 severed preexisting financing
181. Prior to the Code there were a large number of common law and statutory
provisions regulating personal property security interests. While the drafters incorpo-
rated aspects of pre-Code law, no uniform treatment had previously been attempted.
See Kripke, Some Reflections After a Quarter-Century of the Uniform Commercial
Code and on the Inception of a New Bankruptcy Code, 87 Com. LJ. 124, 125 (1982).
Lacking knowledge of the operational detail of asset-based lending, the reporters
solicited the assistance of commercial lenders and other industry "insiders" in formulat-
ing a regulatory scheme. G. Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 85 (1977).
Llewellyn's Code as he conceived it would have abolished the past without at-
tempting to control the future. That jurisprudential approach did not satisfy
the groups of practicing lawyers who participated in the project and whose in-
fluence increased as the drafting approached the final stages. These lawyers
had perhaps become uneasily aware of mounting indications of a new style of
judicial activism. At all events they insisted on a tightly drawn statute, designed
to control the courts and compel decision. To a considerable degree, they got
what they wanted.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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patterns from their roots in particularized statutes, such as the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act' 8 2 and the Factors' Lien Act,' 8 3 and generalized
them to produce a single, unified and standardized system of regula-
tion. As with any assimilation process, over time the "regional differ-
ences" and the unique environments that produced these patterns have
become obscured. Consequently, contemporary scholars increasingly
ask the question: What explains the peculiar system of priorities em-
bodied in Article 9?184
A. General Financing Under Article 9: The Floating Lien
and Future Advances
1. The Favored Status of General Financing Loans. - Perhaps the most
outstanding feature of Article 9 is the extraordinary legal protection
afforded the "floating lien."' 18 5 Subject to various enabling require-
ments, the Code permits a creditor, either in the course of a single loan
or in a continuing financing scheme, to take a security interest in all of
the debtor's assets whether presently held or after-acquired.' 86 Fur-
thermore, the agreement can grant the debtor the liberty to use or dis-
pose of the collateral without directly accounting to the secured
party.' 87 Thus, for the typical floating lien in accounts and inventory,
the collateral will change as accounts and inventory are acquired and as
accounts are collected and inventory sold. Furthermore, under the
Code system of notice filing, this blanket security interest may be insu-
182. Unif. Trust Receipts Act, 3A U.L.A. 577 (1981) (superseded 1952).
183. See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 45 (McKinney 1916) (repealed 1964).
184. See, e.g., Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 605, 620-27 (1981).
185. See, e.g., Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, American Bankers
Ass'n Report 79-80 (1954); Coogan, supra note 178, at 839; see also Gilmore, The
Purchase Money Priority, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1334 (1963) (U.C.C. accepts both the
floating lien and the priority of purchase money security interests). The term "floating
lien" is a short-hand reference to a series of Article 9 provisions including §§ 9-201
(general validity of security agreement), 9-204 (after-acquired property and future ad-
vances), 9-205 (use or disposition of collateral without accounting), and 9-306 (secured
party's rights on disposition of collateral).
186. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1977).
This Article accepts the principle of a "continuing general lien".... The wide-
spread nineteenth century prejudice against the floating charge was based on a
feeling... that a commercial borrower should not be allowed to encumber all
his assets present and future .... This Article decisively rejects [that view]
not on the ground that it was wrong in policy but on the ground that it was not
effective.... This Article, in expressly validating the floating charge, merely
recognizes an existing state of things.
Id. comment 2.
187. U.C.C. § 9-205 (1977) (repealing the rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353
(1925), which held floating liens void where the debtor was given unfettered dominion
or control over the collateral). In later years, Grant Gilmore expressed deep'misgivings
about the Code's unqualified support for the floating lien. See generally Gilmore, supra
note 184, at 625-27.
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lated from third parties merely by an initial filing containing only a gen-
eral description of the collateral. s88
More startling even than the support for security interests in after-
acquired assets is the parallel protection offered to the floating lien
creditor (or "general financer") who elects to make future, uncommit-
ted advances to the debtor. By filing a financing statement, the general
financing creditor will not only have priority on its initial extension of
credit, but the same priority will attach to all future advances as well.
This is true even when the subsequent advances are made without com-
mitment or when the debt supporting the initial security agreement has
been fully repaid, and even when the debtor faces imminent
insolvency.'8 9
A revealing sense of the debate over this treatment of future ad-
vances can be seen in the recent case of Credit Alliance Corp. v. Jebco Coal
Co. 19 0 Jebco Coal borrowed $100,000 from Second Bank secured by a
tractor-loader. A portion of the bank's loan was used to pay off a pre-
existing security interest in the rig held by First Bank. Needing addi-
tional equipment, the debtor subsequently returned to First Bank,
which made a new loan secured by the new equipment. Thereafter,
serious financial reversals forced the debtor into default. As collateral
for its now defaulted loan, First Bank claimed not only the new equip-
ment but the tractor loader as well. The court held that the subsequent
loan, although not contemplated at the time of the original agreement,
was nonetheless a future advance fully secured by the tractor-loader,
and thus entitled to a first priority by virtue of First Bank's original
188. U.C.C. §§ 9-110, 9-402 (1977). See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at
541-45.
189. See U.C.C. §§ 9-204(3), 9-312(7) (1977). The priority of future advances is
unqualified when the dispute is between competing creditors with security interests in
the same collateral. Under the Code's notice system, therefore, a subsequent secured
creditor always takes subject to future advances made pursuant to a preceding security
interest whether the advances are committed or uncommitted. Id. § 9-312(7) comment
7. The future advances priority is subject to limitation, however, when the dispute in-
volves an intervening buyer. id. § 9-307(3), or lien creditor. Id. § 9-301(4).
It is clear that a single financing statement suffices to perfect any advances made
pursuant to a security agreement, and no reference to future advances is required in the
financing statement. Id. § 9-204, comment 5. Furthermore, most courts have held that
a single financing statement is adequate to perfect a secured party's successive interests in
the same collateral even when the interests are created by separate security agreements.
See, e.g., In re Rivet, 299 F. Supp. 374, 377 (E.D. Mich. 1969); In re Merriman, 4 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 234 (S.D. Ohio 1967). Perhaps most illustrative of the Code's
bias toward general financers is the protection given to the initial security interest even
where the initial debt is repaid before the original parties execute a second security
agreement in the same collateral. See Credit Alliance Corp. v.Jebco Coal Co., 688 F.2d
10, 13 (3d Cir. 1982); James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank; 292 Minn. 277, 194
N.W.2d 775 (1972); Review Comm. for Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Final Report, 226-27
(1971).
190. 688 F.2d 10 (3d Cir. 1982).
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filing which was still on the records. The filing date of the original fi-
nancing statement was, of course, earlier than Second Bank's. This
placed First Bank's "future advance" ahead of Second Bank's in any
priority battle.191
The treatment of future advances typified byJebco suggests that the
essence of the Article 9 scheme extends well beyond the basic priority
principle of first-in-time. More significantly, Article 9 affords a creditor
the opportunity-by filing an appropriate notification-to gain exclu-
sive control over a debtor's entire financing venture. Furthermore, this
absolute priority will generally date from the time of filing even though
the filing predates the decision to commit funds to the enterprise.
2. The Prospect Function Revisited. - The priority scheme authorized
by the future advances provisions of the Code appears to grant senior
creditors a "situational monopoly" over a particular financing ven-
ture.192 Clearly, such a system reduces a senior creditor's financing
costs; the creditor need only file once to insure priority. It is tempting
to suggest that the senior creditor requires this advantage in order to
reap the rewards of the initial credit investigation.1 9 3 If all other credi-
tors could subsequently free ride on these efforts, the senior creditor
might refuse to invest in the search for financing opportunities. This
justification is unsatisfying, however, since the senior creditor will be
paid for this first search in the higher price charged for the initial loan.
Furthermore, the cost advantages to a senior creditor must be weighed
against the increased costs to junior creditors whose security is
threatened by unanticipated future advances. Junior creditors must in-
crease the price of their loans or negotiate subordination agreements
with the senior financer. Thus, the savings in lower interest charges
paid to the senior creditor may well be offset by the increased cost of
191. Id. at 13. In a recent case, the Second Circuit significantly eroded the § 9-
301(4) limitation on future advance priority over intervening lien creditors. Dick
Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 746 F.2d 126, 127-28 (2d
Cir. 1984). The court held that certain subsequent advances by a general financer cov-
ering attorney's fees, costs, fixed monthly charges and contingent liabilities were
"nonadvance" obligations and thus not subject to the 45 day priority limitation of § 9-
301(4). Id. at 134.
192. The "situational monopoly" imagery may not be wholly accurate in this con-
text since the debtor retains the option of seeking a substitute financer who will buy out
the first creditor and assume the role of general financer. Thus, the option to terminate
appears at first glance to forestall any exercise of "monopoly" power by the senior credi-
tor. But exercising the termination option may impose substantial costs that effectively
withdraw the debtor from the protection of the competitive market. Obviously, termina-
tion requires the debtor to expend resources in searching for alternative financing. In
addition, introduction of a second lender causes coordination and change of command
problems that may limit the debtor's ability to exploit the growth prospect. Finally, the
debt contract may restrict further the debtor's termination option by incorporating a
prepayment penalty.
193. See Buckley, supra note 22, at 38-39 (arguing that security compensates se-
nior creditor for higher screening costs).
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loans to junior creditors, possibly augmenting the debtor's total credit
bill.
These concerns have prompted several commentators to propose a
"transactional" filing system for those debtors with indivisible collat-
eral who might be particularly disadvantaged if a senior creditor were
able effectively to control the lending rights to all the available as-
sets.' 94 Under a transaction filing system, each credit transaction must
be separately perfected and filed in order to secure priority. Junior
creditors could examine the records at any time and determine ihe
amount of assets available for further credit. Such a system may well
reduce the costs of borrowing from several competing creditors.19 5
These objections to the Code's protection of general financing
loans suffer, however, from inadequate consideration of the beneficial
effects of offering senior creditors such an advantage. Relational the-
ory offers a plausible justification for the Article 9 scheme by focusing
the analysis on the relational creditor's contribution to the success of
the financing venture. Recall that this financing opportunity can be de-
veloped more efficiently when ownership rights are exclusive. An ex-
clusive financing relationship encourages the creditor to manage the
growth prospect properly and to insure the optimal timing of inputs
necessary to achieve maximum return to the joint enterprise.
Edmund Kitch, who demonstrated the power of the prospect func-
tion in its application to patent law, suggests an institutional analogy to
the development of mineral claims in the 19th century. 19 6 Imagine
creditors as prospectors packing their burros every morning and riding
off in search of fortune. They are searching not for gold or silver but
for a financing opportunity. Once a venture is discovered, the pros-
pecting creditor files a claim that gives it the first right to "mine" the
opportunity.' 97 The first-in-time priority principle thus permits debt-
ors to sell claims to competing creditors. As with mineral claims, the
secured creditor stakes out the dimensions of its claim by filing a state-
ment which "reasonably indentifies" the collateral.' 98 Furthermore, a
prospecting creditor's first-in-time priority dates from the filing of its
"claim" even though it has not yet committed any funds to the claim's
development.' 99 Finally, if the claim proves to be a "dry hole," the
creditor must return the prospect to the public domain by filing a ter-
mination notice. 200
194. See Coogan, supra note 178, at 879-80; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at
1167-74.
195. See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 595.
196. Kitch, supra note 57, at 271-75.
197. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1977).
198. U.C.C. § 9-110 (1977).
199. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1977) ("Priority dates from the time a filing is first made
covering the collateral .... ).
200. U.C.C. § 9-404 (1977).
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Relational theory suggests that the legal protection given to pros-
pecting creditors offers several unique benefits to parties seeking to ex-
ploit firm-specific growth opportunities. Searching for a claim
produces information. A creditor unable to "own" that information
might simply abandon the prospect thereby requiring subsequent cred-
itors to duplicate much of its search. Once a prospect is discovered, the
optimal financing of a business opportunity requires the coordination
and timing of inputs. To ensure that positive value prospects are fully
pursued, the creditor makes a substantial investment in monitoring the
debtor and encouraging appropriate operational decisions. This in-
vestment cannot be tied successfully to discrete or sequential con-
tracts.20 1 In addition, the prospect rules reduce the costs of
negotiating for alternative sources of credit, because they induce the
debtor to return to the "owner" of the "claim" for further financing.
Similarly, monitoring costs for the prospecting creditor decrease be-
cause the number of competing secured creditors declines. 20 2
3. The Policing Function Revisited. - Besides protecting the claim of
the general financer, the rules of Article 9 substantially increase the se-
cured party's power to foreclose on the collateral upon default. Since
default is not defined by the Code, parties are free to specify any ac-
tions (or inactions) of the debtor as constituting a default. The key sig-
nificance of default is the automatic invocation of a set of legally
protected privileges granted to the secured party. Thus, for example,
the creditor upon default may proceed directly against the assets held
as collateral. This includes the right to make collections on outstand-
ing accounts, to take control of any proceeds of original collateral, and,
if appropriate, to use self-help to repossess the collateral. 20 3 The re-
possession remedy includes the right to render equipment unuseable
without removal, thus effectively "driving a stake through the heart of
the collateral." 20 4
The creditor's right to proceed directly without judicial process is
constrained only by an injunction against breaches of the peace. Judi-
cial interpretations of this doctrine both before and after the Code's
adoption have limited its reach to actual violence or the threat of vio-
lence. 20 5 Thus, subterfuge and deception are generally given judicial
approval. 20 6 Once in possession and control, the secured party may
201. See Barzel, supra note 57, at 354; Kitch, supra note 57, at 276-77.
202. See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 595-96.
203. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1977).
204. The vampire imagery is part of commercial lawyers' lore. I have been unable
to trace its origins.
205. Thus, for example, a creditor cannot break a garage lock to take a car, Hen-
derson v. Security Nat'l Bank, 72 Cal. App. 3d 764, 140 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1977), or enter a
dwelling on a debtor's land to repossess if the debtor objects, Morris v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 N.E.2d 683 (1970).
206. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 550 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1977)
(creditor falsely told a repair person who had possession of debtor's car that the debtor
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use or operate the collateral in any manner agreed upon, 20 7 dispose of
it in any commercially reasonable manner,208 and charge against the
debtor any expenses incurred in the custody, use, or operation of the
debtor's assets.209
These seemingly draconian privileges, coupled with the broad dis-
cretion given creditors to select among the various alternatives, have
troubled many commentators. The default privileges are an implicit
authorization for the secured creditor to "kill the hostage" whenever
the debtor's actions violate predetermined norms. The normative im-
plications of "killing hostages" may well be troubling, especially in con-
sumer settings. 210 One justification for these provisions rests on the
singular policing function of the relational financer. The cumulative
effect of these default privileges is to increase dramatically the secured
party's leverage over the debtor's business judgments. The social value
of a policing creditor is not a result of its superior access to the evi-
dence of wrongful conduct, but its ability to sanction the debtor effec-
tively should wrongdoing be discovered. The general financer is a
more effective monitor precisely because it can inflict severe punish-
ment for acts of misbehavior at much lower costs than can unsecured
creditors. All other things being equal, the more credible the sanction
had consented to foreclosure); Pierce v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 373 So. 2d 1113 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1979) (creditor surreptitiously followed debtor and repossessed when he
parked the car); Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1967), aft'd, 29 A.D. 2d 767, 288 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1968) (creditor secretly had key
made and used it to enter debtor's business premises and repossess).
207. U.C.C. § 9-207(4) (1977).
208. U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1977).
209. U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(a) (1977).
210. Perhaps the most troubling implication of a hostage theory of security is the
support it gives to the argument that in consumer cases secured creditors systematically
fail to maximize the resale proceeds of repossessed collateral. Recently, Alan Schwartz
has challenged the failure to maximize argument on the premise that it is in the credi-
tor's self-interest to maximize the resale value of repossessed collateral. See Schwartz,
The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26 J.L. & Econ. 117,
124-39 (1983). But if security is used as a hostage, self-interested secured creditors
may repossess not to maximize resale, but to signal their willingness to "kill the hos-
tage" if the consumer-debtor defaults.
Hostage theory provides a plausible explanation for why the repossessing creditor
has inadequate incentives to maximize the value obtained on resale of collateral. If the
repossession is a signal to other debtors, then the costs of repossession, resale and an
uncollectible deficiency judgment are properly charged off as "advertising" the credi-
tor's resolve. Since the motivation for repossessing consumer goods with little resale
value and obtaining a deficiency judgment against an insolvent debtor does not proceed
from an expectation of repayment, there is no particular incentive to risk further costs in
reducing the deficiency. Indeed, the quality of the signal may well be inversely related to
the amount realized upon resale. The greater the creditor's resolve to kill the hostage
notwithstanding the costs of execution, the more effective is the leverage obtained in
subsequent transactions with similarly situated consumers. See Scott, Security Interests
in Consumer Goods: An Essay on Hostage Theory (forthcoming 1986).
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the more effective is the deterrence of disfavored behavior.211
B. Variations on the Theme: Floor Plan Financing
Under a floor plan financing arrangement, the creditor takes a se-
curity interest in the debtor's inventory and proceeds from the sale of
inventory. This type of lending arrangement is used extensively by au-
tomobile dealers, equipment dealers, and retailers of consumer
durables. Typically, the creditor offers wholesale financing of a re-
tailer's inventory in order to receive in return a volume of profitable
chattel paper that under normal circumstances it could not procure.212
At first glance, the legal rules that support floor plan financing ap-
pear strangely contradictory. The Code provides unique protection to
such inventory loans by granting the floor plan creditor a purchase
money priority over a general financer who is prior in time.213 Yet, the
protection the creditor enjoys while the inventory is on the floor is
placed in jeopardy once the goods are sold. If the inventory sale is
authorized under the terms of the security agreement, the creditor's
security interest in the goods sold terminates.21 4 While the security in-
terest continues in the proceeds of the sale,215 the floor plan creditor's
interest in the proceeds is not given similarly protected status. If, for
example, the sale results in either an account or chattel paper, the se-
cured party's claim to either asset based on its original purchase money
interest would now be inferior to a prior general financer.21 6
211. A careful student of the Code might object to this analysis on the ground that
the default rights apply to any creditor whose security interest has attached to the collat-
eral whether or not the security interest has been perfected. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1977).
Thus, it is tempting to argue that default rights are independent of priority questions.
But this objection misses the point. In the first place, the perfection requirements are
only designed to encourage public notice of the security interest; they do not affect the
underlying property rights. Furthermore, the key concern in either case is to identify
the benefits of secured creditor status. A priority claim to assets claimed by a third party
is one of the rights of a secured creditor; the right to foreclose on default is another.
212. See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 572-73.
Generally, the floor plan lender will finance the retailer's purchase of goods at
interest rates which merely cover the lender's costs of extending credit. The
floor plan lender expects to make his profit by purchasing at a discount the
consumer's promise to pay the dealer.
Id. at 572; Biborosch, Floor Plan Financing, 77 Banking LJ. 725, 727 (1960).
213. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1977) and comment 3 ("A perfected purchase money
security interest in inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same
inventory... if [certain conditions are satisfied].").
214. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1977) (Except as otherwise provided, "a security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale... unless the disposition was authorized....")
(emphasis added).
215. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1977) (Except as otherwise provided, "a security interest
continues ... in any identifiable proceeds .... ").
216. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1977) provides in relevant part that a perfected purchase
money security interest in inventory not only has priority over a conflicting interest in
the inventory but "also has priority in identifiable cash proceeds .... " Since other noncash
1986] 959
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Can relational theory illuminate this regulatory scheme? Unlike
the debtor that uses future accounts to finance a growth opportunity,
retail dealers rarely confront unique investment prospects. Retail mar-
kets are thick, and most growth prospects are not firm-specific. 21 7
Short-term financing is important for the dealer because of seasonal
variations in sales that require building up inventory. Under these con-
ditions, the prospecting function of the relational model has less signifi-
cance. But the absence of unique investment prospects does not mean
that floor plan financing lacks positive external benefits. The relative
importance of the policing function is increased in the retail context
where inventory, the debtor's principal asset, can be quickly liquidated
on the retail market. The monitoring burdens of creditors of such a
debtor are substantially higher, and thus, a credible deterrent is corre-
spondingly more valuable.
In the retail context, the risk of conversion or asset substitution is
heightened, as is the difficulty of guarding against this misbehavior.
Giving the floor plan financer a superpriority in the dealer's inventory
provides a payoff for the extraordinary monitoring service that it pro-
vides. The reliability of this "night watchman" is reinforced by the con-
sequences of a failure to detect misbehavior. Should inventory be sold
out of trust or proceeds not repaid to the creditor, the creditor stands
to lose its favored priority position. Since the interest rate on a floor
plan arrangement is based on the assumption that valuable assets are
available to the creditor upon default, 218 the threat of a loss of priority
is a significant disincentive to sloppy monitoring. In turn, other credi-
tors are aware that the floor plan financer has a large stake in prevent-
ing such misbehavior and are encouraged to relax their own individual
vigilance.
In sum, the floor plan financer is a relational creditor tailor-made
for the retail environment. This creditor's contributions to the optimal
development of unique prospects are less than those of the general fi-
nancer. But, in exchange, the floor plan financer assumes a more oner-
ous policing burden-to deter the debtor from exploiting the readily
available market. Indeed, the rules of Article 9 thus can be seen as a
skillful accommodation to the differing functions of the respective fi-
nancing patterns.
proceeds are not protected by § 9-312(3) their priority is determined by the basic first-
in-time rule of § 9-312(5) which, of course, would favor the general financer. To be
sure, if the purchase money secured creditor gave new value and took possession of any
chattel paper proceeds, it could prevail over prior parties by virtue of the protection § 9-
308 offers to purchasers of chattel paper and instruments. For further discussion of the
apparent anomalies in the Code's diverse treatment of subsequent purchasers of instru-
ments, chattel paper, and accounts, see A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 613-16.
217. See Goetz & Scott, Expanded Choice, supra note 27, at 313 (well-developed
markets are characterized by repetitive transactions and specialized terms are specific to
the market or industry rather than to the contract).
218. See Biborosch, supra note 212, at 727-30.
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C. Limitations on the Relational Financer
Two key limitations undermine the support that Article 9 other-
wise provides for relational financing. The superpriority granted to
purchase money interests and the restraints on the secured party's abil-
ity to realize on its collateral in bankruptcy appear to imperil the status
that other provisions so carefully protect. Does relational theory ac-
count for these striking limitations on the leverage otherwise allowed
the relational lender?
1. The Purchase Money Security Interest.
a. The Puzzle. - Under the Code, any creditor who properly per-
fects a purchase money security interest in tangible assets of its debtor
will be entitled to first priority in the assets superior to the claim of a
prior-in-time floating lienor.2 19 Purchase money priority is thus a ma-
jor exception to the first-in-time principle, and it appears difficult to
explain. The puzzle of purchase money priority becomes even more
vexing when the separate treatment of construction mortgage financing
is considered. The Code gives construction mortgage financers a first
priority in all fixtures attached to the real property during construction.
This priority is superior to the claims of purchase money financers of
the fixtures. 2 20 At first glance, the priority given to construction mort-
gagees is confirmation of the explanatory power of relational theory.
The construction mortgagee is an archetype of the relational financer
who seeks to develop a future prospect. But why should this general
financer be insulated from purchase money priority when others are
not?
The traditional argument for giving priority to a subsequent
purchase money financer is that it brings "new money" into a faltering
enterprise.22 1 Furthermore, it is argued, the general financer should be
unconcerned because the debtor is supporting the new loan with new
collateral. Thus, the senior financer's interests are unaffected. 2 22
Without a richer analysis, however, this argument is problematic. Jack-
son and Kronman have shown, for example, that the general financer
generally would be able to finance the new purchase more cheaply than
a second creditor.2 23 This comparative advantage stems principally
from the prior investment the relational financer has made in screening
the debtor's prospects. Assuming the debtor's circumstances are rela-
tively unchanged, the general financer's marginal costs of investigating
219. See U.C.C. §§ 9-312(3), 9-312(4) (1977).
220. U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1977). The absolute priority of the construction mortgage
depends on the mortgage being recorded before the goods become fixtures and the
goods becoming fixtures before the completion of construction.
221. See, e.g., 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 777-79 (1965);
Gilmore, supra note 185, at 1337-38.
222. See Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Com-
mercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929, 936 (1985).
223. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at 1167-70.
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the second loan are lower than the investigative costs of a second
lender who knows nothing about the debtor.224 Furthermore, rela-
tional theory demonstrates the fallacy in the conventional assertion that
the general financer "doesn't care" if a subsequent purchase money
interest materializes. A prime inducement to relational financing is the
benefit of exclusive control and management of the prospect. Both co-
ordination and monitoring costs are increased by introducing a second
lender.22 5
Despite the advantages of the general financer underwriting the
new purchase, Jackson and Kronman argue that in a hypothetical
"creditors bargain," general financers would sell any purchase money
priority back to the debtor at the time the initial deal was negotiated.
They reason that such a contract would be cheaper to negotiate than
one that gave the general financer blanket priority over the new acquisi-
tions. In essence, the general financer would be paid in advance for its
comparative advantage rather than receive a premium on a case-by-case
basis when subsequent loans were made.2 2 6 Relational theory, how-
ever, suggests that this explanation is implausible. The parties would
not be able to predict ex ante what the purchase money priority is
worth, since its value depends on the success of the financing venture.
Thus, in any hypothetical bargain we would expect general financers to
retain the welfare-enhancing leverage of purchase money priority.
b. Two Possible Justifications. - The relational model yields two
plausible hypotheses that may offer a more convincing jusitification for
purchase money priority. The first hypothesis focuses on the diver-
gence of interests between the debtor and the relational financer. Since
the creditor's rate of return is fixed in advance, it has less incentive than
the debtor to pursue high-risk, high-return opportunities that arise af-
ter the initial venture is planned. The creditor's conservatism in adher-
ing to the initial development plan may be inconsistent with
maximizing the value of the firm.
This conflict of interest is, however, a difficult one for the parties to
control. It is unlikely that the debtor can successfully monitor the se-
cured party's actions for excessive conservatism.2 27 As an alternative,
224. Furthermore, the general financer would have lower monitoring costs for the
second loan than would the second lender, because the general financer would only
have to monitor the new collateral and not the debtor's entire affairs. Id.
225. Monitoring costs for the general financier [C 1] will increase whenever another
financer [C 2] occupies a priority position in some of the debtor's [D] assets even where
those assets are purchased with "new money." This is because the presence of a com-
petitor increases the risk of collusion between D and C2 in which C2's lien is "fed" by
bleeding C l's assets. This risk of collusion requires increased investment in segregating
those assets in which C l's priority claim is based.
226. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at 1172-75. TheJackson & Kronman argu-
ment is further analyzed in A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 636-37.
227. One problem the relational debtor faces is its comparative disadvantage in
monitoring a creditor's actions. The relative disadvantage stems from a lack of internal
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the creditor can offer a bond against such future misbehavior. It is
tempting to regard the debtor's unilateral right to terminate the rela-
tionship as an adequate bond against creditor conservatism. Unfortu-
nately, in many contexts exercising a right of termination is very costly
for the debtor. Not only must the debtor locate a second financer to
buy out the first loan, but the development of the prospect itself is im-
paired by the interruption and shift in control.228 Lacking good substi-
tutes, the parties might well agree in advance that the debtor could
offer purchase money priority to a second financer. The effect of such
an agreement is to offer the debtor an "escape hatch" to pursue pros-
pects that have a positive value to the firm. This escape hatch concep-
tion is consistent with (and gives more rigorous meaning to) the
conventional "new money" justification for purchase money priority.
A second justification for purchase money priority rests on the hy-
pothesis that the purchase money financer, in fact, enjoys an advantage
which, if exploited, would benefit the venture. If creditors who take
purchase money interests have specialized, complementary skills, then
the general financer would predictably agree to subordinate its interest
to procure these unique advantages. 229 The suppliers of equipment or
inventory who take a purchase money interest in specific assets can
serve an important auxiliary policing function not well performed by
the general financer. Because they are specialized in the sale and serv-
icing of specific assets, credit sellers often can reduce the costs of moni-
toring the debtor's use of these assets. Familiarity with the assets and
frequent contact for maintenance and servicing generate scale econo-
mies that reduce the costs of detecting conversions or asset
substitutions.230
Both of the justifications suggested by relational theory are consis-
tent with the treatment of construction mortgages under Article 9.231
The protection given the construction mortgagee encourages the ex-
clusive control essential to the successful development of the project.
financial expertise as well as the high fixed costs of hiring external financial auditors and
consultants in order to undertake the necessary monitoring of financial inputs.
228. See supra note 192.
229. While purchase money security interests are defined broadly under the Code,
the priority traces its lineage to conditional sales of equipment and inventory. Cf.
U.C.C. § 9-107 (purchase money interest includes an interest taken by the seller of col-
lateral and one taken by any creditor giving value that enables the debtor to acquire the
collateral).
230. The "comparative advantage" explanation of purchase money priority is the
best example of Levmore's focal point monitoring theory. See Levmore, supra note 7,
at 55-58. The argument works as an explanation for purchase money priority so long as
the conditional seller's normal servicing and maintenance activities generate economies
of scale that reduce the costs of monitoring the debtor for asset substitutions. Once the
comparative advantage premise is satisfied, it follows that in a hypothetical bargain the
relational creditor would sell purchase money priority to the conditional seller in ex-
change for valuable monitoring services.
231. U.C.C. 9-313(6) (1977).
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But because the project is time-limited, fears of the creditor's excessive
conservatism are substantially reduced. In other words, there is no
need for the financing creditor to post a bond since the risk of such
misbehavior is diminished.
The unique treatment of construction mortgages is also consistent
with the comparative advantage hypothesis. In the typical construction
project, the financing mortgagee already has well developed monitor-
ing capabilities and ready access to all tangible property affixed to the
construction site. It seems unlikely, therefore, that a complementary
monitoring function would usefully be provided by a subsequent
purchase money creditor.
2. Security Interests in Bankruptcy.
a. General Introduction to Bankruptcy Law. - No attempt to rational-
ize the scheme of priorities in Article 9 is complete without considering
the effects of federal bankruptcy law. While the priority claim of the
general financing creditor is recognized in bankruptcy, in the event of
reorganization both the creditor's leverage and its ability to realize on
the collateral are significantly reduced. In addition to the threat that
some or all of the secured claim will be set aside as a voidable prefer-
ence, the collectivization process of federal bankruptcy law will inevita-
bly constrain the priority entitlements granted by Article 9.
The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay of
any action by the secured creditor to collect claims or seize the collat-
eral.2 3 2 A secured creditor can be relieved from a stay only by proving
that the debtor has no equity interest in the secured assets and that the
assets are not necessary for a reorganization, or that the collateral is
jeopardized.2 33 Meantime, the bankruptcy trustee can continue to op-
erate the business so long as the secured party is given "adequate pro-
tection. ' 234 The court has broad latitude in determining what
protection is adequate, including provisions for replacement liens, peri-
odic cash payments, or the "indubitable equivalent" of the creditor's
asset claim.2 3 5
232. Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(4) (1982) (the filing of a bankruptcy petition oper-
ates as a stay of "any act to ... perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate").
233. Bankruptcy Code § 362(d) (1982); see also In reJacobsenJ-J Ranch, Inc., 4
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 245 (M.D. Fla. 1978) ("Normally, injunctive protection is freely
granted upon showing that there is substantial equity in the property involved; that the
collateral is not in jeopardy; that the properties are indispensible to a successful ar-
rangement[, or] that there is a real possibility that the debtor will be able to effectuate an
arrangement ....").
234. Bankruptcy Code § 361 (1982) (codified at II U.S.C. § 361(3)).
235. Id. The § 361 definition of adequate protection is not meant to be exclusive.
Exactly what constitutes adequate protection, however, is unclear. Section 361(2) pro-
vides that "an additional or replacement lien" can constitute such protection. More
commonly, a creditor is given a margin of oversecurity. See, e.g., In re Blazon Flexible
Flyer, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 861, 864 (N.D. Ohio 1976) ($1,340,000 debt secured by assets
valued at $5,731,000). An alternative method of protecting secured parties under § 361
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Finally, if the court finds a reorganization plan fair and equitable, it
can be "crammed down" over the objections of a dissenting class of
"impaired" creditors.2 36 Obviously, the adequacy of the creditor's pro-
tection depends on how the creditor's interest is valued in any reorgan-
ization proceedings. The cram-down plan will typically provide the
secured creditor with deferred cash payments equivalent to the dis-
counted present value of the collateral. Unfortunately for the secured
creditor, the trustee is motivated to set a low discount rate so that in-
stallment payments to the creditor are low even though the present
value of the income stream remains high.2 37 Given the coercive powers
granted to the bankruptcy court in reorganization proceedings, it is un-
surprising that secured creditors frequently accept plans that impair
nonbankruptcy priorities. Whatever the leverage given to the secured
creditor prior to insolvency, its control is measurably reduced in
bankruptcy.
b. The Clash Between Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code. - Commenta-
tors universally agree that there is a potential conflict between the pri-
ority claims recognized by Article 9 and the "equality" norm that
underlies bankruptcy sharing. 238 . Thomas Jackson, in a series of
thoughtful essays, has argued that some of this tension is undesir-
is to provide them periodic cash payments. See In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367, 368
(2d Cir. 1971). The final method of providing adequate protection under § 361 is to
award the secured party the "indubitable equivalent" of his interest in the property. But
how this is to be done remains unsettled. Pre-Bankruptcy Code case law strongly sug-
gests that valuation problems will frequently result in protection that is less than "com-
pletely compensatory" (the meaning suggested by Learned Hand, In re Murel Holding
Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935)). See, e.g., In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367,
369 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Yale Express System, 384 F.2d 990, 992 (2d Cir. 1967). In-
deed, the Bankruptcy Code explicitly recognizes the possibility that "adequate protec-
tion" will be inadequate, and offers the secured creditor a priority claim in the general
distribution of assets to (at least in part) compensate for the inadequacy. Bankruptcy
Code § 507(b) (1982). For a further discussion of the problems of valuing a secured
creditor's claim in bankruptcy, see A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 806-10.
236. Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b)(1) (1982). See generally A. Schwartz & R. Scott,
supra note 1, at 810-13 (discussing generally plan confirmation and cram down pro-
cess); Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 133
(1979) (complexity of cram down provisions should encourage debtor-creditor bargain-
ing to produce an acceptable reorganization plan); Pachulski, The Cram Down and Val-
uation Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 925 (1980)
(interested parties have incentive to compromise to avoid court battle over valuation).
237. See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 811-13 (discussing valuation of
collateral and deferred cash payments to secured creditors); see also Jackson, Bank-
ruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 Yale L.J. 857,
872-77 (1982) (suggesting that compensation deemed to be adequate by the courts
rarely provides the secured creditor with the indubitable equivalent of the market value
of the item in which the creditor has a security interest) [hereinafterJackson, Creditors'
Bargain].
238. See, e.g., A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 809-10; Eisenberg, Bank-
ruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 953 (1981); Jackson, Creditors' Bargain,
supra note 237, at 859-60; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at 1147-49
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able.239 Using the model of a hypothetical creditors bargain, Jackson
demonstrates that the affected parties would agree in advance to a col-
lectivization process to maximize the total pool of assets and to resolve
vexing prisoner's dilemma problems. The centerpiece ofJackson's the-
ory is the assertion that prebankruptcy entitlements should be impaired
in bankruptcy only when necessary to maximize net asset distributions
to the creditors as a group and never to accomplish purely distribu-
tional goals. 240 While much of Jackson's argument is appealing, it is
only partially successful in rationalizing bankruptcy law. Indeed, Jack-
son isolates numerous instances where current features of the bank-
ruptcy process violate this maximization norm.24 1
To be sure, the maximization norm is a dominant theme in bank-
ruptcy. Maximizing the value of the debtor's estate requires a collectiv-
ization process, 242 but any resulting redistribution of prebankruptcy
239. See T.Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law: The Implications of
Collective Action and Discharge Policies (forthcoming 1986);Jackson, Avoiding Powers
in Bankruptcy, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (1984) [hereinafterJackson, Avoiding Powers];Jack-
son, Creditors' Bargain, supra note 237, at 868-70.
240. Jackson, Creditors' Bargain, supra note 237, at 868-71; Jackson, Avoiding
Powers, supra note 239, at 727-31.
241. Jackson discusses a number of instances in which bankruptcy law "systemati-
cally ignores" the creditors' bargain vision. SeeJackson, Creditors' Bargain, supra note
237, at 874. Thus, for example, courts exhibit a tendency to grant less than adequate
protection to secured parties claims in reorganization proceedings. See id. at 872-77.
Similarly, bankruptcy law grants the debtor and the bankruptcy trustee broad freedom
to choose a nonacceleration-based compensation standard for both lenders and execu-
tory contract holders. Id. at 879-91. Even more striking deviations from the creditor's
bargain model are found in section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and the doctrine of
Moore v. Bay, in which a trustee can entirely avoid secured interests that an identified
unsecured creditor could have avoided outside of bankruptcy only to the amount of its
claim. See Bankruptcy Code § 544(b). Jackson correctly observes that from the per-
spective of a creditors' bargain model, "[t]he Bankruptcy Code's embodiment in section
544(b) of the holding... of Moore v. Bay is unfortunate... [and] . . . unprincipled."
Jackson, Avoiding Powers, supra note 239, at 742-50 (referring to Moore v. Bay, 284
U.S. 4 (1931)). The effect ofjudicial interpretation of § 544(b) as well as the plain lan-
guage of § 544(a) (the so-called strong arm clause), and § 365 (granting the Trustee the
power to reject (or assume) executory contracts) is to effect a redistribution of preban-
kruptcy entitlements from secured to unsecured creditors. Id. at 750-56.
ProfessorJackson has argued subsequently that some of these apparent anomalies,
especially the provisions that permit rejection or assumption of executory contracts, can
be explained in terms of his normative theory. See Letter from ThomasJackson (Dec. 3,
1985) (on file at the offices of the Columbia Law Review). It may well be that the credi-
tors' bargain norm is the dominant theme in bankruptcy. The point advanced here is
merely that other norms, misguided or not, are also present in bankruptcy and that this
interaction between competing normative theories produces a tension that should con-
cern legal scholars.
242. Collectivization solves a classic "prisoner's dilemma" that confronts the credi-
tors of an insolvent debtor. If maximizing total creditor welfare is desirable, bankruptcy
law must provide incentives for individual creditors so that each of them finds it optimal
to wait rather than to collect immediately. By requiring creditors to disgorge payments
received shortly before bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code reduces the incentives of cred-
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entitlements undermines the parties' incentives to reduce the risks of
future contingencies through mutually beneficial executory con-
tracts. 243 Furthermore, any redistribution of prebankruptcy entitle-
ments will necessarily create perverse incentives that motivate parties
to use the bankruptcy process strategically.2 4 4
Given the force of these arguments, how can we explain the persis-
tence of redistributional impulses in bankruptcy? 245 One obvious an-
swer is that the bankruptcy process reflects a genuine tension between
the maximization objective and a competing distributional norm: that
all participants should share (at least in part) in the unanticipated or
"common" risks of business failure.2 4 6 Under this conception, bank-
itors to grab assets through individual collection efforts and thus force piecemeal liqui-
dation. See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 776-77; Jackson, Creditors'
Bargain, supra note 237, at 861-64.
243. See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 23, at 1149; Jackson,
Creditors' Bargain, supra note 237, at 868-70.
244. The existence of two different sets of entitlements generates perverse incen-
tives for both creditors and debtors. Unsecured creditors and debtors opt for bank-
ruptcy when their distribution of the bankrupt estate exceeds their entitlements under
state law. Secured creditors prefer state law when deprived of state law entitlements in
bankruptcy. Therefore, parties are motivated to maneuver strategically between legal
regimes resulting in net social losses. Uniformity between state and bankruptcy law alle-
viates these problems.
245. The pressures toward bankruptcy sharing are most frequently manifested in
bankruptcy reorganizations where security interests in specific assets are converted into
deferred cash payments. The key to the conversion process is the choice of an appropri-
ate discount rate. Courts animated by a maximization norm will award a discount rate
that is similar to the rate creditors receive under state law. Assuming the presence of an
acceleration clause, secured creditors are entitled to the entire outstanding principal
upon default. This amount, paid in cash, or in kind by seizure of the collateral, can then
be reinvested at the current market rate of interest. See, e.g., Memphis Bank & Trust
Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 429, 431 (6th Cir. 1982); In re Scovill, 18 Bankr. 633,
634 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981); In re Landmark at Plaza Park Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653, 657-58
(Bankr. D.NJ. 1980).
On the other hand, courts animated by risk sharing notions adopt a variety of rates
that vary from the current market rate for similar loans. Frequently, it is clear that the
courts consider redistribution from secured creditors to unsecured creditors and debt-
ors appropriate. One commonly adopted rate is the rate payable by delinquent taxpay-
ers under 26 U.S.C. § 6621 (1985). This rate is the average predominant prime rate
quoted by commercial banks to large businesses. See, e.g., In re Caudle, 13 Bankr. 29,
37-38 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1981) (the contract rate would be "unreasonable and inequi-
table ... and would jeopardize an otherwise good plan to the detriment of other affected
creditors and particularly the holders of unsecured claims."); In re Ziegler, 6 Bankr. 3
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (§ 6621 "is reasonably responsive to current economic condi-
tions, is subject to periodic revision, yet is not an unfair burden on Chapter 13 debt-
ors"). Other courts have awarded the coupon yield rate of 52 week treasury bills. See,
e.g., In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. 542, 545 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) ("the discount rate is not
intended to give any creditor a profit").
246. See, e.g., P. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America: Insolvency, Impris-
onment for Debt, and Bankruptcy 13 (1974) (federal bankruptcy rules justified as a form
of compulsory insurance that spreads risk). See generally Note, The Proper Discount
Rate Under the Chapter 11 Cram Down Provisions: Should Secured Creditors Retain
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ruptcy sharing is viewed as a response to an unanticipated common dis-
aster for creditors, much like a hurricane or an earthquake. 247 Risk
sharing solutions for unanticipated risks are not unique to bankruptcy.
In addition to the rules of general average governing salvage at sea, 248
a similar tension between foreseeable and unforeseeable risks has long
characterized the contract doctrines of excuse and impossibility.249
Those business failures that we actually observe are, of course, neither
perfectly foreseeable nor entirely unforeseen. Both kinds of risks are
likely to have contributed to a debtor's financial distress. So long as
both norms influence legal policymakers, therefore, there will be inevi-
table tension between these apparently incompatible conceptions of the
functions of bankruptcy.250
their State Law Entitlements or Should these Entitlements Be Redistributed to Un-
secured Creditors and the Debtor?, 72 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming, Fall 1986).
247. To understand this redistributional rationale it is helpful to draw out more
fully the analogy between risk sharing and common disasters. When an area is struck by
flooding, a state of emergency is frequently declared and victims are assisted with public
funds. It is quite appropriate for society to respond when unanticipated catastrophies
strike. But it is curious that we are equally willing to assist when the disaster is not
unanticipated but foreseeable, as in the case of individuals who choose to remain in the
flood plain. Presumably, these individuals could either move to a safer location or in-
sure themselves against the knowable risk of flooding. The government subsidy reduces
their incentives to do so. Similarly, it is not surprising that firms that fail because of
unpredictable technological shifts are able to seek relief in bankruptcy. Yet, more sur-
prisingly, bankruptcy also is open to debtors whose negligent or improvident actions
cause their insolvency.
One reason why these two situations are not distinguished is the operational diffi-
culty of distinguishing the victims of unforeseeable consequences from those who
should properly bear the foreseeable consequences of their actions. Perhaps more plau-
sibly, the explanation may rest on the limited range of choices open to both flood vic-
tims and unsecured creditors. For many victims of flood damage neither insurance nor
relocation are economically feasible. Similarly, unsecured creditors are often employees
or trade creditors who find it unfeasible to take security. See Note, The Proper Discount
Rate Under the Chapter 11 Cram Down Provision, 72 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming, Fall
1986).
248. The basic principle underlying general average is that if a vessel loaded with
valuable cargo should founder at sea, the captain may make necessary sacrifices of the
cargo or the vessel to prevent the ship and cargo from sinking altogether. All parties
involved in the voyage will contribute to the general average expense according to their
percentages of ownership. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 220-47
(1957). For a discussion of the general average analogy to bankruptcy sharing rules, see
Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditor's Bargain Heuristic, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev.
(forthcoming Fall 1986).
249. See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 1, at 414-18.
250. Redistributional concerns arise in numerous contexts in addition to the exam-
ples discussed above. For example, a secured creditor is not impaired under § 1124(2)
if the debtor cures a previous default and reinstates the contract rate of interest despite
the presence of an acceleration clause. The intent of this provision is made clear by a
Senate Report on § 1124(2):
The intervention of bankruptcy and the defaults represent a temporary crisis
which the plan of reorganization is intended to clear away. The holder of a
claim or interest who under the plan is restored to his original position, when
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The relational financing model appears to rationalize at least some
of this apparent tension between the maximization and distributional
norms of federal bankruptcy. At first glance, the common disaster per-
spective seems wholly inconsistent with the notion of consenual secur-
ity and a system of prebankruptcy priorities. By reconceptualizing the
function of security, relational theory relieves some of this apparent in-
compatibility. The primary purpose of prebankruptcy entitlements,
thus conceived, is not to guarantee creditors' claims against the
postbankruptcy asset pool, but rather to affect socially beneficial con-
trol over the venture before bankruptcy. The relational creditor is best
analogized to the captain of a ship struggling in high seas. He is paid to
steer the vessel through the shoals to safety, but if the ship founders the
captain has a right of salvage only to the extent of his accrued salary.
To induce optimal prebankruptcy control it may well be necessary to
give the secured creditor a priority payment out of the asset pool. But
once prebankruptcy services have been compensated, there is no neces-
sary inconsistency between security and bankruptcy sharing rules.
The relational model thus provides some justification for those
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that purport to restructure preban-
kruptcy entitlements.2 5 1 Relational theory shifts the focus from secur-
ity's function as a postbankruptcy claim against specific assets to its role
as prebankruptcy leverage that reduces the risk of misbehavior and
business failure. Inevitably, some debtors will suffer business failure
despite pursuing the optimal investment strategy. In these cases, limit-
ing the secured party's ability to realize infull is not incompatible with
the leverage function of security. As long as the expected return from
successful ventures motivates relational financers to invest in business
prospects, the social utility of security can be maintained.
I do not mean to suggest that efforts to accommodate competing
norms within the bankruptcy process are unproblematic. Quite possi-
bly, the costs of accommodating both visions-especially the invitation
for individual debtors and creditors to manipulate the bankruptcy pro-
cess for strategic purposes-exceed any corresponding social benefits.
Furthermore, bankruptcy sharing rules may help existing victims at the
possible expense of future parties. Any redistributional effects of bank-
ruptcy reduce the relative attractiveness of security to creditors and
others receive less or get nothing at all, is fortunate indeed and has no cause to
complain.
S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5787, 5906.
251. Bankruptcy law has never purported to grant absolute recognition to preban-
kruptcy entitlements. The stated policy of the federal courts interpreting bankruptcy
law has been to accord substantial respect to state created rights "unless in conflict with
federal policy and equitable principles." See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v.
Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161-63 (1946); Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States, pt. 1, at 70 ("For the most part [prior claims] should be recognized in
the bankruptcy process.") (emphasis added).
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thus reduce the price differential between secured and unsecured
credit. Sharing assets with unsecured creditors and residuals claimants
thus may impose costs on potential insolvent debtors who would other-
wise benefit from a wider variance in the price of secured and un-
secured credit.
CONCLUSION
All of the hypotheses that seek to explain secured financing are
grounded in the belief that persistent institutional regularities rest on
purposive foundations. But what do the rules of Article 9 and the busi-
ness practices that it regulates actually do? Understanding these com-
plex institutions requires a theoretical framework to explain why
certain arrangements persist. The variety of competing theories of se-
cured debt vividly illustrates that this first step is often a Sisyphean la-
bor. Frequently, insight comes only through the accreting effects of
successive scholarly efforts. By building on these efforts, I have pro-
posed a relational theory that purports to supply a coherent explana-
tion of a dominant pattern of secured financing. The theory holds that,
in certain classes of transactions, security functions as a unique contrac-
tual mechanism for controlling the conflicts of interest that otherwise
hinder the development of business prospects. The leverage obtained
by holding the debtor's assets hostage enables the creditor to influence
the debtor's decisionmaking, particularly when the relationship is
threatened by business reversals. Without a system of security, some
projects of positive present value will not be pursued and others will be
inadequately developed.
Many other explanations of the operation of these financial mar-
kets are both possible and plausible. The choice among competing vi-
sions ultimately rests, therefore, on the accumulated evidence of the
actual operation of credit markets. In many respects, the evidence ad-
duced in support of a relational theory of secured financing speaks for
itself. The tools of observation for the legal anthropologist are embar-
rassingly crude. But if the universe of secured debt is anything like the
evidence revealed from examining reported cases, standard form con-
tracts, and the ways the industry purports to operate, relational theory
remains the most promising basis for understanding the nature and
function of secured transactions. This theory alone cannot explain the
institution of secured financing. But as a complementary vision to ex-
isting monitoring cost explanations, it reinforces the power of the cen-
tral hypothesis that various contractual mechanisms for controlling
debtor-creditor conflict can measurably increase the value of the firm.
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EXHIBIT II
Loans for Securities to Total Loans
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0.28
0.24
0.22-
0.2-
0.18
0.16-
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
1940-1980; insured commercial banks
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics
1941-1970, at 134-35 (Sept. 1976); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Annual Statistical Digest 72-80 (1970-1979), 64-65 (1980), 66-67 (1981),
68-69 (1982).
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EXHIBIT III
Comml. & Ind. to Total Loans
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1940-1980; insured commercial banks
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics
1941-1970, at 134-35 (Sept. 1976); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Annual Statistical Digest 72-80 (1970-1979), 64-65 (1980), 66-67 (1981),
68-69 (1982).
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RELATIONAL THEORY
EXHIBIT IV
Retail Auto Loans to Total Loans
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics
1941-1970, at 134-35 (Sept. 1976); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Annual Statistical Digest 72-80 (1970-1979), 64-65 (1980), 66-67 (1981),
68-69 (1982).
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